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Irresolute Testators, Clear and
Convincing Wills Law
Jane B. Baron*
Abstract
Controversial recent wills law reforms, embodied in new
provisions of both the Uniform Probate Code and the Restatement
of Property, excuse so-called harmless errors in will execution and
permit judicial correction of erroneous terms in a will or trust.
Both reforms pose evidentiary dangers, as proof of the error must
come from outside the attested instrument and will be offered after
the testator’s death. To respond to this concern, both the error and
the testator’s true intent must be established by “clear and
convincing” evidence.
This Article is the first to examine how courts have applied
the clear and convincing evidence standard to these important
reforms of wills law. In practice, the clear and convincing evidence
standard provides less evidentiary protection than its proponents
expected. More importantly, judicial struggles with the clear and
convincing evidence standard expose a deep fissure in the very
concept of testamentary freedom.
The reforms assume—as does the Wills Act itself—a fully
formed, fixed set of choices that the testator has sought to express
in his will, choices made by a conventionally rational choosing
testamentary self for whom wills rules further self-determined
ends. This conventionally rational testator makes only innocent,
inconsequential errors. Many of the testators in the actual cases,
however, display only bounded rationality. Their errors are not
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simple accidental snafus. While the reforms contemplate
correction only of the technical, innocuous expression or execution
errors made by self-reliant, choosing testamentary selves, at least
some courts care also about the more complicated errors made by
vulnerable, irresolute testamentary selves. These courts push
against the reforms’ boundaries. The clear and convincing
evidence standard has not and will not function as a serious limit
on mistake correction because it fails to reckon with both visions of
testamentary freedom.
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I. Introduction
The musty law of wills has been substantially refurbished
over the last half century to solve a recurring problem. It has long
been clear that the formal requirements governing will execution
have the capacity to defeat the very intent they were designed to
further. Small, inconsequential errors in signing or witnessing a
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will can lead to the invalidation of the document, even where the
court is confident that the decedent intended the document to
serve as his will. 1 The first wave of wills law reform sought to
solve this problem by reducing the number of required
formalities. 2 A second and more controversial wave of reform,
embodied in new provisions added to both the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC) 3 and the Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and
Donative Transfers (Restatement), 4 sought to solve the problem
differently, by excusing “harmless errors” in will execution if
“clear and convincing” evidence shows that the decedent intended
the document to be a will. 5
The will execution reform was quickly followed by another
reform permitting judicial correction of erroneous terms in a will
or trust. This mistake correction reform departed starkly from
prior law that generally excluded extrinsic evidence of the
testator’s intent if the words of the will or trust were
1. I use the male pronoun throughout this Article to avoid any suggestion
that male testators are resolute and female testators irresolute.
2. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 2 pt. 5 gen. cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969)
(“The basic intent of these sections is to validate the will whenever possible. To
this end . . . formalities for a written and attested will are kept to a minimum.”).
3. UNIF. PROBATE CODE (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013).
4. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
(AM. LAW INST. 2015).
5. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2013) (validating an improperly executed document if clear and convincing
evidence establishes that the decedent intended the document to be his will);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 (AM.
LAW INST. 2015) (“A harmless error in executing a will may be excused if the
proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
adopted the document as his or her will.”). These reforms are explained infra
Part II.A. On the importance of—and the controversy surrounding—these
reforms, see Daniel B. Kelly, Toward Economic Analysis of the Uniform Probate
Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 855, 877 (2012) [hereinafter Kelly, Toward
Economic Analysis] (describing the harmless error rule as a “significant
development”); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ.
L. REV. 235, 279 (1996) (describing UPC section 2-503 as a “revolutionary
change”); James Lindgren, The Fall of Formalism, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1009, 1009
(1992) (describing the UPC execution reforms as a “big step” in reconciling the
law of wills and contracts); C. Douglas Miller, Will Formality, Judicial
Formalism, and Legislative Reform: An Examination of the New Uniform
Probate Code “Harmless Error” Rule and the Movement Toward Amorphism, 43
FLA. L. REV. 599, 601 (1991) (describing UPC section 2-503 as a “major
innovation”).
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unambiguous. 6 Before allowing reformation of the text of
donative documents, the revised UPC and Restatement require
clear and convincing evidence both of the mistake in the
document’s existing terms and of the testator’s true intent. 7
This Article is the first to examine how courts are applying
the clear and convincing evidence standard to these important
reforms of wills law. 8 In practice, the clear and convincing
6. On the prior law, see infra Part II.B (describing the historical practice
of excluding extrinsic evidence because of the unavailability of the testator).
7. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2013) (“The court may reform the terms of a governing instrument . . . if it is
proved by clear and convincing evidence what the transferor’s intention was and
that the terms of the governing instrument were affected by a mistake of fact or
law . . . .”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“A donative document . . . may be reformed . . . if it
is established by clear and convincing evidence[:] (1) that a mistake of fact or
law . . . affected specific terms of the document; and (2) what the donor’s
intention was.”). These reforms are explained infra Part II.A.
8. Prior commentary has focused mainly on the wisdom of excusing clear
errors and on the experiences of the countries that adopted the will execution
reform ahead of the United States, with particular attention paid to whether the
reforms have created a slippery slope problem of habitual noncompliance with
Wills Act requirements. See, e.g., Wayne M. Gazur, Coming to Terms with the
Uniform Probate Code’s Reformation of Wills, 64 S.C. L. REV. 403, 420 (2012)
(suggesting that the reformation reform will add to estate litigation); Stephanie
Lester, Admitting Defective Wills to Probate, Twenty Years Later: New Evidence
for the Adoption of the Harmless Error Rule, 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 577,
583 (2007) (examining how the harmless error rule and substantial compliance
fared in Australia from 1987–2007); Miller, supra note 5, at 705 (arguing that
the harmless error rule will compromise existing limits on the issues to be
resolved after the testator’s death); John V. Orth, Wills Act Formalities: How
Much Compliance Is Enough?, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 73, 80 (2008)
(tracing how the slippery slope of relaxing formalities to determine
testamentary intent, without more guidance than “do the right thing,” creates a
new avenue for judicial activism).
There is one exception to this line of commentary. In 2002, when both UPC
section 2-503 and Restatement section 3.3 were relatively new, Emily Sherwin
argued that “the true function of the clear and convincing evidence standard is
to give the appearance of a compromise, when in fact a choice has been made in
favor of fact-sensitive adjudication and against determinate formality rules.”
Emily Sherwin, Clear and Convincing Evidence of Testamentary Intent: The
Search for a Compromise Between Formality and Adjudicative Justice, 34 CONN.
L. REV. 453, 474 (2002). Sherwin’s direct concern, however, was not wills law
particularly but legal formality generally, with the UPC harmless error rule
serving merely as an example of the impossibility of a position intermediate
between formalism and case-by-case evaluation of intent. Id. at 460. She
considered the potential effectiveness of the will execution reform only as a
logical and theoretical matter and did not purport to examine how the reform
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evidence standard provides less evidentiary protection than its
proponents expected. Nor has it functioned as apparently
intended to cabin the reforms to a narrow range of technical
mistakes in execution or expression.
The courts’ struggles with the clear and convincing evidence
standard expose a fissure in the concept of testamentary freedom.
The reforms assume—as does the Wills Act 9 itself—a fully
formed, fixed set of choices that the testator means to express in
his will. For a testator with such intent, the will functions as a
“safe harbor,” 10 in which his wishes are protected against the
unreliable statements of others and his own potential
ill-considered changes of mind. The safe harbor contemplates a
coldly rational, choosing testamentary self for whom wills rules
are a means for furthering self-determined ends. The reforms
contemplate correction only of technical, innocuous errors in the
expression or execution of that testator’s intent.
But many of the testators in the cases do not seem to
correspond to the model underlying the Wills Act and the
reforms. These testators cannot bring themselves to make the
final decisions about their property that the Wills Act rules are
meant to effectuate or, if they do, they change their minds. 11
Their errors are not the simple technical snafus the reforms
appear to contemplate. Nevertheless, courts work hard to fit
them under the reform provisions. These efforts are consistent
with other wills rules which envision and protect more emotional,
ambivalent testators—testators who, for example, fail to take
actually functions in the courts. See generally id.
9. The term “Wills Act” refers generically to the probate code provisions
prescribing rules for making a valid will. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H.
SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 147 (9th ed. 2013) (“The probate code of
every state includes a provision . . . which prescribes rules for making a valid
will.”).
10. See John H. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors in the Execution of
Wills: A Report on Australia’s Tranquil Revolution in Probate Law, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 4 (1987) [hereinafter Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors] (“The
greatest blessing of the Wills Act formalities is the safe harbor that they
create. . . . The testator who complies with Wills Act formalities assures his
estate of routine probate in all but exceptional circumstances.”).
11. See, e.g., In re Estate of Windham, No. 287937, 2010 WL 293064, at *1–
2 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010) (per curiam) (describing a testator who initially
devised her estate to her son and then in weeks before her death, lined out her
son’s name on a copy of the will and wrote in her daughter’s name).
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care in expressing themselves or to update their wills. Both
testators are a part of wills law. The clear and convincing
evidence standard addresses only the technical errors of the
self-reliant choosing testamentary self. But at least some courts
care also about the more complicated errors of the vulnerable,
irresolute testamentary self. These courts push against the
reforms’ boundaries. As a result, the clear and convincing
evidence standard has not, and will not, function as a serious
limit on mistake correction.
Part II examines the development of the will execution and
mistake correction reforms in wills law. The trajectory of this
history, from “substantial compliance” to “harmless error,” is
well-established. What has not been sufficiently appreciated is
the role of a heightened evidentiary standard in the development
of the reforms. The reforms were never meant to displace the
view of will-making inherent in the Wills Act itself, which
assumes a finalized testamentary intent of which unambiguous
evidence can be found. Part III details the courts’ application of
the clear and convincing evidence standard, demonstrating how
much less protection the standard offers than might be expected.
This problem may have less to do with the courts than with the
testators themselves, whose will-making practices reflect a much
less determinate intent than the Wills Act and the reforms
envision. Part IV explores whether and why it matters that the
clear and convincing evidence standard does not function as its
proponents anticipated. It argues that wills law recognizes two
discordant versions of testamentary freedom, one envisioning a
conventionally rational testator capable of once-and-for-all
decision making and the other envisioning a testator whose
rationality is noticeably bounded and whose choices are much
more tentative. A true reform of wills law would encompass both
of these visions.
II. Evidence and the Harmless Error/Mistake Correction Reforms
This Part contextualizes the will execution and mistake
correction reforms, explaining their place in the range of efforts to
deal with execution and expression errors. The reforms address
directly what makes wills errors so difficult to correct—the
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potential unreliability of the evidence of mistake. 12 The clear and
convincing evidence standard was built into the reforms in
response to this evidentiary problem. However, the strategy of
requiring clear and convincing evidence shares the assumption of
earlier strategies that testators have a fixed and final intent that
they mean to state once and for all in their wills.
A. The Case for Excusing Harmless Errors
The new execution and mistake correction reforms address
an old problem. The formalities of the Wills Act have long been
thought to perform intent-effectuating functions. 13 They are said
to provide a ritual, cautioning testators that their acts should be
taken seriously, 14 to produce reliable evidence of testators’
wishes, 15 to protect testators (in the case of nonholographic wills)
from fraud, undue influence or other forms of pressure, 16 and to
channel testators into forms of expression easily recognized by
courts as wills. 17 Similarly, the rules prohibiting correction of
12. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 147 (“The witness who is
best able to authenticate the will . . . and to clarify the meaning if its terms is
dead by the time the court considers such issues.”).
13. See Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classification of
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 3–4 (1941) (explaining the function of wills
formalities in convincing the court of the testator’s deliberate and final intent to
effectuate a transfer).
14. See id. at 4 (“The formalities of transfer generally require the
performance of some ceremonial for the purpose of impressing the transferor
with the significance of his statements . . . . This purpose of the requirements of
transfer may conveniently be termed their ritual function.”).
15. See id. (explaining that formalities may increase the reliability of proof,
counteracting inaccurate oral testimony and the unavailability of the main
actor).
16. See id. at 4–5 (“[T]he . . . prophylactic purpose of safeguarding the
testator . . . [is] the protective function.”).
17. The first three functions derive from Gulliver & Tilson. Id. John H.
Langbein added the fourth, channeling, function to this canonical listing in his
article Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act [hereinafter Langbein,
Substantial Compliance], 88 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1975). See id. at 493–94
(invoking the “channeling” function of contract law to explain the purpose of the
Wills Act formalities).
I have argued elsewhere that these functions were not of primary concern in
the adoption of the Wills Act, and that there is reason to question the
understanding of human behavior that underlies the functional justification of
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mistaken terms are thought to protect against the dangers of
potentially unreliable extrinsic evidence. 18 Yet, however well
those rules might work for the well-advised and well-represented
testators who follow them, the reported cases show that at least
some testators whose intentions are undisputed fail to comply
with them in some respect or another. 19 These testators sign
outside the presence or sight of the witnesses, 20 or they have their
will witnessed by only one of two required witnesses, 21 or they
place their signature somewhere other than at the “end” or “foot”
of the will, 22 and so forth. For these testators, the rules are not
intent-effectuating, but intent-defeating because “once a formal
defect [in execution] is found, Anglo-American courts have been
unanimous in concluding that the attempted will fails.” 23
form. See generally Jane B. Baron, Gifts, Bargains, and Form, 64 IND. L.J. 155
(1988–89).
18. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (explaining prior law barring
reformation and explaining that “[r]eforming a will, it was feared, would often
require inserting language that was not executed in accordance with the
statutory formalities”). On the “plain meaning” or “no extrinsic evidence” rule,
see DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 328 (“[A] majority of states
follow . . . two rules that, operating in tandem, bar admission of extrinsic
evidence to vary the terms of a will. [T]he plain meaning of the words of a will
cannot by disturbed by evidence that the testator intended another
meaning . . . . [C]ourts may not reform a will to correct a mistaken term . . . .”).
See also 1-5 Schoenblum, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 5.16 (LexisNexis
Matthew Bender 2015) (explaining the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to
contradict the terms of a will). For a critique of the plain meaning rule, see Jane
B. Baron, Intention, Interpretation, and Stories, 42 DUKE L.J. 630, 656–57 (1992)
(advocating a storytelling approach to will interpretation).
19. See, e.g., In re Groffman, [1969] All E.R. 108 (Eng.) (declining probate
to a document the court was “perfectly satisfied” was intended as the testator’s
will because the two witnesses were not present at the same time at execution,
as required by the statute).
20. See e.g., In re Estate of Berg, No. 268584, 2006 WL 2482895, at *2–3
(Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2006) (describing how Berg signed out of sight of one of
the two required witnesses).
21. See, e.g., In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d 1134, 1135–36 (Mont. 2002)
(explaining that the will was signed by only one witness where the execution
statute required two).
22. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 149 (explaining how the
original Wills Act of 1837 required the will to be signed “at the foot or end
thereof,” known generally as subscription).
23. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 489; see also id. at
498 (“[W]hat is peculiar about the law of wills is not the prominence of the
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One response to the problem of the rules’ intent defeating
potential is to ignore it. This is the approach of courts that
require strict compliance with the Wills Act and that exclude
extrinsic evidence in cases where unambiguous wills contain
mistaken terms. 24 From an institutional perspective, this is a safe
choice. Especially with respect to Wills Act formalities, it is not
clear that courts have authority to deviate from legislatively
specified will execution requirements. 25 On the other hand, the
strict compliance approach does nothing to further wills law’s
objective of furthering freedom of disposition. 26 And it allows
much unjust enrichment of unintended beneficiaries. 27
A second way to address the problem is simply to reduce the
number of formalities required for due execution. This was the
strategy adopted in the 1969 UPC. 28 Gone, for example, was the
formalities, but the judicial insistence that any defect in complying with them
automatically and inevitably voids the will.”). Note, however, that “there is
considerable diversity and contradiction in the cases interpreting what acts
constitute compliance with what formalities.” Id. Courts can reduce the impact
of the automatic-invalidity rule and of the strict compliance approach simply by
straining to find that the will’s execution did in fact comply with the applicable
requirements.
24. But see generally Mark Glover, Decoupling the Law of Will-Execution,
88 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 597 (2014) (arguing that the formalities and the strict
compliance rule have different purposes).
25. See Sherwin, supra note 8, at 458 (noting, with respect to the
substantial compliance doctrine, that “the source of courts’ authority to
disregard the literal terms of the will statutes was left unclear”); see also
Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 6 (“The substantial
compliance doctrine is the only avenue open to the courts without legislative
intervention.”); see also Litevich v. Prob. Court, Dist. of W. Haven, No.
NNHCV126031579S, 2013 WL 2945055, at *16 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 17, 2013)
(declining to adopt the harmless error rule as a “judicial gloss” to the
Connecticut statute prescribing requirements for a valid will).
26. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmts. a, c (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“[T]he organizing principle of
the American law of donative transfers is freedom of disposition. Property
owners have the nearly unrestricted right to dispose of their property as they
please.”).
27. On the problem of unjust enrichment, see infra note 344 and
accompanying text.
28. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, intro. pt. 5 gen. cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1969) (“If the will is to be restored to its role as the major instrument for
disposition of wealth at death, its execution must be kept simple.”); see also
Richard V. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code: Blueprint for Reform in the
70’s, 2 CONN. L. REV. 453, 453 (1970) (describing the UPC’s drafting process).
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requirement that a will be signed “at the end,” or that the
witnesses be “present at the same time” when the testator signed
or acknowledged the will. 29 The fewer the formalities required,
the lower the number of wills invalidated on purely technical
grounds, where the testator’s intent will be defeated due to
inadvertent, inconsequential execution errors. But for wills that
failed to comply with the relaxed requirements of the 1969 UPC,
the automatic invalidity rule held fast, raising the same issues as
arose under the prior strict compliance approach. 30
To solve this problem, John Langbein proposed, in a
ground-breaking article published in 1975, an entirely different
way to avoid unfortunate outcomes: the doctrine of “substantial
compliance.” 31 Under this doctrine, the finding of a formal defect
would not lead to automatic invalidity, but rather to a further
inquiry: “[D]oes the noncomplying document express the
decedent’s testamentary intent, and does its form sufficiently
approximate Wills Act formality to enable the court to conclude
that it serves the purposes of the Wills Act?” 32 If, in a case of
improper execution, the functions of the relevant formalities were
satisfied, Langbein argued that the will should be admitted to
probate notwithstanding the technical error. 33
However, in 1987, after studying experience with statutory
reforms in Australia, Langbein moved in an altogether different
29. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2013) (requiring only the testator’s signature and the signature of two witnesses
for a formal will execution); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 cmt. (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 1969) (“The formalities for execution of a witnessed will have been
reduced to a minimum . . . . The intent is to validate wills which meet the
minimal formalities of the statute.”).
30. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 510
(comparing a “rule of reduced formalism” to the UPC approach which “reduce[s]
the number of required formalities,” but noting “although both techniques work
generally in the same direction, they will produce different results in many
cases if the UPC’s ‘minimal formalities’ are to be enforced with the same
literalism as before”); see also Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1011 (“The approach of
the Uniform Probate Code from 1969 to 1980 was to reduce will formalities, but
to require strict compliance with those formalities.”).
31. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 489 (insisting
that the formalism of wills law is “mistaken and needless”).
32. Id.
33. See id. at 515–16 (“[T]he substantial compliance doctrine would admit
to probate a noncomplying instrument that the court determined was meant as
a will and whose form satisfied the purposes of the Wills Act.”).
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direction. 34 Rather than seeking to ascertain whether the
functions of form had been met on the facts, as was required
under the substantial compliance doctrine, Langbein proposed
instead that any and all compliance errors be excused entirely if
the testator’s intent that the document constitute his will is
proven to a high degree of confidence. Under this new harmless
error proposal, the extent to which an instrument’s form
“approximate[s]” Wills Act requirements is entirely immaterial as
long as the evidence that the testator intended the document as
his will is otherwise convincingly clear. UPC section 2-503 and
Restatement section 3.3 alike adopt this approach. Section 2-503
of the 2010 UPC provides that a document not executed in
compliance with the provisions of the Wills Act may nonetheless
be treated as a will if it is established by clear and convincing
evidence that the decedent intended the writing to constitute his
or her will. 35 Restatement section 3.3, promulgated a few years
later, provides that “a harmless error in executing a will may be
excused if the proponent establishes by clear and convincing
evidence that the decedent adopted the document as his or her
will.” 36
34. See generally Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10.
35. UPC section 2-503’s “dispensing power” extends to formally-flawed
efforts to revoke, amend, or revive a will. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503
(amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013)
Although a document or writing added upon a document was not
executed in compliance with Section 2-502 [stating requirements for
valid will execution], the document or writing is treated as if it had
been executed with that section if the proponent of the document or
writing establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the
decedent intended the document or writing to constitute:
(1) the decedent’s will
(2) a partial or complete revocation of the will,
(3) an addition to or an alteration of the will, or
(4) a partial or complete revival of his [or her]
formerly revoked will or of a formerly revoked
potion of the will.
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 3.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2015). The reasons for preferring the harmless error
approach to the substantial compliance approach have been frequently
rehearsed. Langbein found that the courts purporting to apply the substantial
compliance approach tended not to focus, as the doctrine intended, on whether
the defect in question was “harmless to the statutory purpose.” Langbein,
Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 531. Instead, the courts asked
whether the testator’s compliance was “near perfect.” See Langbein, Excusing

14

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2016)

Toward the end of his article proposing the harmless error
reform, Langbein noted that “the development of a statutory
remedy to cure mistakes in complying with execution formalities
invites consideration of the parallel . . . problem of mistakes in
content,” 37 such as dropped paragraphs or misdescribed devisees.
In accordance with an earlier proposal made in an article
co-authored with Lawrence Waggoner, 38 Langbein argued that in
the mistaken term context as in the execution context, the law
should be prepared to correct the error if the error is proved to a
high degree of certainty. 39 UPC section 2-805 and Restatement
section 12.1, adopted in the 2008 and 2003 respectively, reflect
this approach, permitting reformation to conform the testator’s
document to reflect his intention if both the mistake and the
intention are proved by “clear and convincing evidence.” 40 In
Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 53 (“[T]he courts read into their substantial
compliance doctrine a near-miss standard, ignoring the central issue of whether
the testator’s conduct evidenced testamentary intent.”). Meanwhile, the power
to excuse harmless errors, which was applied far more often to attestation
mistakes than those involving writing or signature, brought the formal law of
wills into proper “alignment” with the law of will substitutes, where writing and
signature are virtually indispensable, but attestation uncommon. Id. at 52–53.
The reform also made sense in the context of wills law itself, making the
presumption of invalidity applicable to defectively executed wills rebuttable
rather than conclusive. Id. at 53. Finally, the Australian experience showed that
there was no need to fear that open acknowledgment and correction of execution
errors would somehow open a floodgate of litigation. See id. at 51 (“[T]he
litigation levels have been astonishingly low.”).
37. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 53.
38. See generally John H. Langbein & Lawrence W. Waggoner, Reformation
of Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 521 (1982) [hereinafter Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills].
39. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 53 (“And
the standard of proof should be pitched below that of criminal law but above
that of ordinary civil litigation—in American parlance, clear and convincing
evidence.”).
40. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2013)
The court may reform the terms of a governing instrument, even if
ambiguous, to conform the terms to the transferor’s intention if it is
proved by clear and convincing evidence what the transferor’s
intention was and that the terms of the governing instrument were
affected by a mistake or fact or law, whether in expression or
inducement.
The Restatement provides:
A donative document, though unambiguous, may be reformed to
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combination, the execution and mistake correction reforms reject
the “relentless formalism” of the older law of wills. 41
B. The Evidentiary Problem
This history of reform is fairly well established. What has not
been previously appreciated, however, is the extent to which a
higher than normal standard of proof—the clear and convincing
evidence standard—has been integral to the reforms from the
start. As we have seen, prior law held that, even under the more
relaxed rules of the 1969 UPC, mistakes in execution
automatically invalidated a will and mistaken terms could not be
corrected. The danger involved in correcting both kinds of
mistakes is evidentiary. Proof of the error and of the testator’s
intent must come from outside the attested will and will be
offered when the testator is incapable of clarifying, correcting, or
contradicting the unreliable statements of the living. 42 The
reforms’ response is to require more and better evidence—
evidence that is “clear and convincing.”
The evidentiary problem has long been clear. Gulliver and
Tilson’s “classic” 43 explanation of why the requirements for will
execution are formal begins by depicting an evidentiary dilemma:
conform the text to the donor’s intention if it is established by clear
and convincing evidence (1) that a mistake of fact or law, whether in
expression or inducement, affected specific terms of the document;
and (2) what the donor’s intent was. In determining whether these
elements have been established by clear and convincing evidence,
direct evidence of intention contradicting the plain meaning of the
text as well as other evidence of intention may be considered.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (AM.
LAW INST. 2015). The concept of these reforms originated in section 415 of the
Uniform Trust Code. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 415 (amended 2005) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2014); see also UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2010) (“Added in 2008, Section 2-805 is based on Section 415 of the Uniform
Trust Code, which in turn was based on Section 12.1 of the Restatement (Third)
of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers (2003).”); see Gazur, supra note
8, at 409–10 (describing the development of the reforms).
41. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 489.
42. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 147 (“The witness who is
best able to authenticate the will . . . and to clarify the meaning of its terms is
dead by the time the court considers such issues.”).
43. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 492.
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“If all transfers were required to be made before the court
determining their validity,” they wrote, “it is probable that no
formalities except oral declarations in the presence of the court
would be necessary” because the court “could observe the
transferor, hear his statements, and clear up ambiguities by
appropriate questions.” 44 But transfers are not made before
courts, and this is why the law imposes “requirements of transfer
beyond evidence of oral statements of intent.” 45 Langbein made a
similar point about evidence, observing that “the ‘chief
justification’ for the Wills Act formalities . . . is that the testator
must inevitably be unavailable at the time of litigation to
authenticate or clarify his intention. This factor justifies the
formalities.” 46
As noted earlier, the formalities are potentially
intent-effectuating, serving ritual, evidentiary, protective, and
channeling functions. 47 While the functions of formality are
intimately connected because “whatever tends to accomplish one
of these purposes will also tend to accomplish the [others],” 48
some of these functions were considered more important than
others from the start. For example, even as Gulliver and Tilson
identified the protective function of attestation, they sharply
criticized its necessity and effectiveness. 49 The 1969 UPC’s
elimination of prior requirements that the testator publish the
will, that the witnesses sign in the testator’s presence, that the
will be signed at “the end,” and that the witnesses be
disinterested, 50 all “markedly weakened the ceremonial value of

44.
45.
46.
47.

Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 13, at 3.
Id.
Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 501.
Supra notes 13–17 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. a (AM. LAW
INST. 2015) (“Four discrete functions have been attributed to the formalities—
the evidentiary, cautionary, protective, and channeling functions.”).
48. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 497 (quoting Lon
Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 803 (1941)).
49. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 13, at 9–10 (asserting that the
protective function “is difficult to justify under modern conditions”).
50. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1969)
(dispensing with the formalities of publishing, signing at the foot of the
instrument, and signing in the presence of attesting witnesses).
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attestation.” 51 From this, Langbein concluded that “the Code’s
requirements for attested wills suggest that it is primarily the
evidentiary and channeling purposes of the Wills Act which
survive in modern times.” 52 Of these two, Langbein had no
trouble concluding that the evidentiary function is “primary.” 53
But if the evidentiary function of form matters, then any
relaxation of formal requirements is potentially worrisome, as it
reduces the certainty that the instrument in question reliably
evidences the testator’s intent. 54 Langbein was attentive to this
concern when he proposed the substantial compliance reform,
assuring readers that the two most important evidentiary
safeguards, a writing and a signature, would not be threatened
under his new approach. 55 “A will with the testator’s signature
omitted does not substantially comply with the Wills Act because
it leaves in doubt . . . the formation of testamentary intent,
deliberate and evidenced.” 56 Similarly, “the substantial
compliance doctrine would have no practical effect on the
requirement that wills be in writing. Written terms, written
signature, and—where mandated—written attestation comprise a
group of formalities whose omission could scarcely be
insubstantial.” 57 Because writing and signature requirements
were indispensable under the substantial compliance approach,
the quality and quantity of evidence of the testator’s intent would
necessarily be high. 58
51. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 511.
52. Id.
53. See id. at 492 (“The primary purpose of the Wills Act has always been
to provide the court with reliable evidence of testamentary intent and of the
terms of the will.”); see also Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1027 (“In the law of wills
the overriding fear is that unattested language will be used to pass property at
death.”).
54. See Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 579
(explaining that the no-reformation rule responded to “the difficulty and danger
of proving that a testator now dead made a mistake in his duly executed will”).
55. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 518 (“Our
courts rely upon signatures as the most important evidence of finality of
intention. . . . Signature is also the primary evidence of the will’s authenticity.”).
56. Id. (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 518–19.
58. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 37 (“The
requirement that the testator must have substantially complied with the Wills
Act . . . serves much the function of an afforced standard of proof. Complying
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But the evidentiary problems arising under the will
execution reform are potentially far more serious because, in
theory, even documents that do not come close to following Wills
Act requirements are still eligible to be probated. 59 Langbein first
confronted this problem in the context of his and Waggoner’s
proposal to reform wills containing mistaken terms. 60 In that
analogous context, 61 courts faced the same problem as arose with
defectively executed wills: the evidence of mistake “must
necessarily be presented when death has placed the testator
beyond reply” and will involve statements “which he can now
neither corroborate nor deny.” 62 Just as the solution to the
problem of faulty execution had traditionally been to invalidate
the will, the solution to the problem of “inherently suspect” 63
extrinsic evidence in the reformation context had traditionally
been to exclude it. 64 But there was an alternative, which courts
had already used when asked to reform non-testamentary
documents executed inter vivos, even when reformation was
substantially necessarily involves conduct that evinces unmistakable
testamentary intent.”).
59. See Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 569
(“To the extent that a mistake case risks impairing any policy of the Wills Act, it
is the evidentiary policy that is in question.”).
60. Id. Proposed in 1982, the reformation reform fell between the time of
the substantial compliance and harmless error proposals. Although introduced
after the reformation reform, the harmless error execution reform was adopted
by the UPC first, in 1990. The reformation reform did not appear in the UPC
until later, in 2008. See John H. Langbein, Major Reforms of the Property
Restatement and the Uniform Probate Code: Reformation, Harmless Error, and
Nonprobate Transfers, 38 ACTEC L.J. 1, 8–9 (2012) [hereinafter Langbein,
Major Reforms] (“In 2008, the Uniform Law Commission amended the Uniform
Probate Code to incorporate the Restatement's reformation rule, giving the rule
a statutory basis in enacting jurisdictions.”).
61. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 35–36
(asserting a “cogent analogy” between problems of mistaken terms and mistakes
in execution).
62. Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 525; see
also Gazur, supra note 8, at 406 (observing that a will is different from other
instruments because it is the statement of the testator who “is always deceased
and unable to testify when the instrument is interpreted, raising the possibility
of fraud and unreliable, self-serving testimony by those hoping to change the
outcome under the will”).
63. Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 526.
64. See id. at 525 (identifying the testator’s primary protection against
mistaken or fabricated evidence as the exclusion of all evidence).
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sought after the death of the donor. That alternative was to
require the evidence of mistake to be “clear and convincing.” This
higher standard of proof was described as “the essential
safeguard” in the reformation cases. 65 “The safeguard that
prevents reformation from being abused—for example, by being
employed to interpolate a spurious term—is the ancient
requirement of an exceptionally high standard of proof.” 66
The South Australian statute on which Langbein modeled
the harmless error reform responded to the evidentiary danger
inherent in mis-executed wills by requiring that there be “no
reasonable doubt” that the decedent intended the document to
serve as his will. 67 This standard, so resembling the “beyond
reasonable doubt” standard applicable in criminal, but not civil,
cases in the United States, struck Langbein as too demanding. 68
While the preponderance of the evidence standard ordinarily
applicable to civil litigation might be appropriate in substantial
compliance cases because “complying substantially necessarily
involves conduct that evinces unmistakable testamentary

65. Id. at 526, 578; see also UNIFORM TRUST CODE § 415 cmt. (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2010) (“Because reformation may involve the addition [or deletion] of
language to the instrument . . . reliance on extrinsic evidence is essential. To
guard against the possibility of unreliable or contrived evidence in such
circumstance, the higher standard of clear and convincing proof is required.”).
66. Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 568; see
also id. (“It is the heavy burden of proof according to a clear-and-convincingevidence requirement that is the real safeguard against fraud and abuse, rather
than the categorical denial of relief.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS &
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (explaining that
the new strategy to deal with “inherently suspect” extrinsic evidence is not to
exclude it altogether, as had been the case in the past, but to “guard against
giving effect to fraudulent or mistaken evidence by imposing an above-normal
standard of proof”).
67. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 9
(quoting Wills Act Amendment Act (No. 2) 1975 (S. Aust.) s 9 (Aust.) (amending
the Wills Act of 1936, §§–1975 (S. Aust.) s 12(2), 8 S. Aust. Stat.
665)) (instructing courts to deem a document a will if it is satisfied “that there
can be no reasonable doubt that the deceased intended the document to
constitute his will”).
68. See id. at 34 (“[I]n some [of the cases under the South Australian
dispensing power statute] adherence to the BRD standard would have required
courts to frustrate well-proven testator’s intent under a remedial statute that
was designed to achieve the opposite.”).
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intent,” 69 he argued that in harmless error cases the clear and
convincing evidence standard struck “the appropriate balance.” 70
The official comments to both the UPC and Restatement
reform provisions link the use of the clear and convincing
evidence standard for the mistake correction reforms in wills law
to the traditional justifications for the use of the clear and
convincing evidence standard in other legal contexts. In
Addington v. Texas, 71 where the standard of proof for involuntary
commitment was at issue, the United States Supreme Court
described three functions served by elevated proof standards:
1) instructing the fact finder about the degree of confidence in the
correctness of factual conclusions, 2) allocating the risk of error
between litigants, and 3) indicating the relative importance
attached to the ultimate decision. 72 The comment to UPC section
2-503 invokes the risk allocation and importance-signifying
functions directly: “By placing the burden of proof upon the
proponent of a defective instrument, and by requiring the
proponent to discharge that burden by clear and convincing
evidence . . . Section 2-503 imposes procedural safeguards
appropriate to the seriousness of the issue.” 73 The comment to
Restatement section 12.1 permitting reformation of mistaken
terms refers to all three functions: “The higher standard of proof
under this section imposes a heightened sense of responsibility on
the trier of fact,” “imposes a greater risk of an erroneous factual
determination on the party seeking reformation,” and, by inviting
searching appellate court scrutiny, “pressures the trial judge to
do an especially careful job.” 74 Thus the clear and convincing
evidence standard marks the execution and term correction
reforms of the Wills Act as high-stakes decisions in which it is
69. Id. at 37.
70. Id.
71. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
72. Id. at 423. The third factor is restated later in the opinion as
“impress[ing] the factfinder with the importance of the decision.” Id. at 427.
73. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2013).
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 12.1 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2015). Comment e to Restatement section 12.1 cites
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), an authority the U.S. Supreme Court relied
on in Addington. 441 U.S. at 423–28.
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especially important for courts to pay close attention and worry
about accurate fact-finding. 75 This attention to accuracy is
integral to the reform.
The higher degree of certainty required under and provided
by the clear and convincing evidence standard responds to
another potential problem posed by the relaxation of the
formalism of older wills law, the threat of an explosion of
previously foreclosed litigation over the validity and meaning of
wills. 76 “Perhaps the most recurrent concern in discussions about
the merits of a harmless error rule for Wills Act blunders,”
Langbein wrote, “is the fear of a litigation imbroglio.” 77 Relatedly,
permitting reform of mistakes in will drafting or execution might
invite a different slippery slope problem of carelessness in will
preparation. 78
75. There are many provisions of the UPC other than section 2-503 and
section 2-805 providing that a certain fact will be deemed true or presumed
under specified circumstances, but permitting the contrary to be shown if the
facts offered to rebut the presumed state of affairs are established by clear and
convincing evidence. See generally, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-104, 2-210, 2702, 5-311 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). The mistake correction
reforms can be seen to fit this pattern in that, as explained infra text
accompanying notes 60–63, they state a presumption that faulty execution
bespeaks lack of testamentary intent, but permit the contrary to be shown if
proven by clear and convincing evidence. The other UPC provisions relying on
clear and convincing evidence are akin to the mistake correction reforms in that
they involve facts of unusual importance, such as death, survival or parentage.
As is the case with will execution errors and mistake correction, in these cases
much also turns on the outcome, and thus the factfinder must both understand
the importance of the issue before him and have a high degree of confidence in
the factual conclusions reached.
76. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 36 (“[T]he
drafters of the South Australian statute sought a higher-than-ordinary standard
of proof . . . [because] [t]hey were inviting litigation about an issue . . . that due
compliance . . . forecloses, namely, whether to treat an imperfect instrument as
a will.”).
77. Id. at 37.
78. For recent commentary echoing this concern, see, e.g., Mark Glover,
The Therapeutic Function of Testamentary Formality, 61 KAN. L. REV. 139, 173
(2012) [hereinafter Glover, The Therapeutic Function] (“[A] rule of relaxed
formalism could encourage testators to execute wills informally and without the
assistance of a lawyer.”); Adam J. Hirsch, Formalizing Gratuitous and
Contractual Transfers: A Situational Theory, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 797, 829
(2014) (“The harmless error power might tend to encourage carelessness and
breed litigation, or open up avenues for fraud.”); Kelly, Toward Economic
Analysis, supra note 5, at 878 (“In theory, adopting harmless error or
reformation could affect the incentives of a testator or the testator’s attorney” to
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The response to the concern about a litigation explosion had
two parts. The first focused on the kind of litigation that arises
under the automatic-invalidity rule that the reforms set out to
change. If a court’s only option with respect to an improperly
executed will is to deny it probate, then in cases of technical
noncompliance there is pressure to interpret the facts in a
strained manner to reach the conclusion that despite what might
look like evidence to the contrary the will was in fact properly
executed. 79 This pressure produces a case law that the reformers
described as “awkward” 80 and sometimes “dishonest.” 81 The
reformers claimed that the new, purposive, analysis required
under the reforms’ approach would produce better litigation: “The
choice is not between litigation and no litigation. In cases of
defective compliance the important choice is between litigation
resolved purposefully and honestly . . . or irrationally and
sometimes dishonestly under the rule of literal compliance.” 82
Litigation that more honestly and directly addressed the real
concerns would, in turn, render litigation more “predictable.” 83
But the reformers’ claim went further. Improving the quality
of the litigation, they argued, would lead to a reduction in certain
kinds of suits: “A harmless error rule actually decreases litigation
about Wills Act formalities,” suppressing litigation about
“technicalities of compliance.” 84 But what would really reduce the
take care in executing or reviewing the terms of a will).
79. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 525
“The rule of literal compliance can produce results so harsh that
sympathetic courts incline to squirm,” asking questions such as, “Is a
wave of a testator’s hand a publication or an acknowledgement. Was
the signature ‘at the end’? When the attesting witnesses were in the
next room, were they in the testator’s presence?” (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 526.
81. Id. at 525.
82. Id. at 526; see also Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1016 (“[U]nder the
dispensing power the issues litigated will change for the better. Litigation about
formalities will lessen; litigation about testamentary intent will increase.”).
83. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 51.
84. Id.; see also Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 526
(“[T]he standard would be more predictable, and contestants would lose their
present incentive to prove up harmless defects.”). Indeed, Langbein speculated
that it was the older rule that might foster needless litigation: “[A]t least for
execution defects of the near-miss type, the rule of strict compliance may
actually promote litigation, by inciting courts to bend the ostensible rules in
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quantity of suits—the real preventative to the feared “litigation
imbroglio”—was the heightened evidentiary standard built into
the reforms. “The clear-and-convincing-evidence standard,”
Langbein wrote, “would raise the threshold for directed verdict
and
summary
judgment
to
a
level
that
would
85
deter . . . litigation.” This thought is echoed in the Comment to
Restatement section 12.1: “The higher standard of
proof . . . imposes a greater risk of an erroneous factual
determination on the party opposing reformation . . . . This
tilt . . . deters a potential plaintiff from bringing a reformation
suit on the basis of insubstantial evidence.”86 Lest all this seem
too hypothetical, the reformers had hard evidence to back it up.
Litigation levels in Australia were “astonishingly low.” 87
Neither, it was argued, would the reforms truly risk the
other potential slippery slope problem of inviting careless
execution or drafting. The reformed provisions, with their direct
mention of evidence, mark the new statutes as rules of litigation.
The reformers argued that professional estate planners never
rely on litigation; 88 to the contrary, “they opt for maximum
formality, in order to be in the best possible position to defend the
will against any claim of imposition or want of finality.” 89 Nor
would the reforms “attract the reliance of amateurs, nor increase
the number of homemade wills.” 90 Those are the wills, of course,
about which litigation is assumed to be most frequent, 91 but the
ways that make the outcomes hard to predict.” Langbein, Excusing Harmless
Errors, supra note 10, at 28.
85. Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 587.
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 12.1 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
87. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 51; see also
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013)
(“Experience in Israel and South Australia strongly supports the view that a
dispensing power like Section 2-503 will not breed litigation.”).
88. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 524
(“Precisely because the substantial compliance doctrine is a rule of litigation, it
would have no place in professional estate planning.”); Langbein & Waggoner,
Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 587 (“Precisely because the reformation
doctrine is a rule of litigation, no draftsman would plan to rely on it when
proper drafting can spare the expense and hazard of litigation.”).
89. Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 524.
90. Id.
91. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 8
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reformers asserted that the standard of proof would reduce
lawsuits over them. 92 If the proponent’s burden of proof of a
defective will is “onerous,” 93 as it would be under the clear and
convincing evidence standard, then he will “forego the trouble
and expense of hopeless litigation.” 94
C. Reform, Not Revolution
In the end, the reformers conceptualized the harmless error
rule as simply a variant on a presumption already implicitly
present in the Wills Act. 95 When a will is proper in form, it is
presumed to reflect serious, genuine, authentic testamentary
intent. 96 But the presumption is rebuttable. 97 Contestants may
challenge the presumption raised by due execution by showing
inter alia that the testator lacked capacity or did not in the
circumstances truly intend the executed instrument to serve as
(explaining that “Wills Act execution blunders arise mostly in home-executed
wills”). But see infra notes 346–350 and accompanying text (challenging the
assertion that mistakes are made only by those who lack means or access to
legal advice).
92. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 566 (“By
substituting a purposive analysis for a formal one, the substantial compliance
doctrine would actually decrease litigation about the formalities. The standard
would be more predictable, and contestants would lose their present incentive to
prove up harmless defects.”).
93. Id. at 525.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 513 (“Proponents . . . are now entitled to presume from due
execution . . . the existence of testamentary intent and the fulfillment of the
Wills Act purposes.”).
96. See R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Weight and Effect of Presumption or
Inference of Due Execution, 40 A.L.R.2d 1223, § 1 (originally published in 1955)
(“It is a relatively well-established principle of the law of wills that when it is
shown that a will has been attested . . . a presumption arises that the will was
duly executed, that is, that it was executed with the formalities required by
law.”); Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 513 (explaining that
this presumption serves to “routinize probate” and “transform hard questions
into easy ones”).
97. See Hursh, Weight and Effect of Presumption or Inference of Due
Execution, supra note 96, § 7(a) (“Both the courts which regard the presumption
arising from proof of attestation of a will as one ‘of fact’ and those which regard
it as one ‘of law,’ are in agreement that the presumption is a rebuttable one, and
may be overcome by evidence to the contrary.”).
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his will. 98 The “central insight” underlying the harmless error
rule is just the mirror image: “[T]he law could avoid so much of
the hardship associated with the rule of strict compliance if the
presumption of invalidity now applied to defectively executed
wills were reduced from a conclusive to a rebuttable one.” 99 Thus,
under the will execution reform, lack of due execution gives rise
to the presumption that the document was not intended as the
testator’s will, but proponents may challenge that presumption
by showing that, despite the execution defect, the testator did
seriously intend the document to serve as his will. 100 Like other
important factual presumptions created by the UPC, the rebuttal
must be clear and convincing. 101 The reforms were presented as a
significant change in the law, but not a revolutionary one.
Before moving on to the cases applying the clear and
convincing evidence standard, it is worth noting three other
important limits on the reforms’ ambitions. First, the will
execution reform was not intended to displace the Wills Act
formalities, which continued to be seen as creating a safe harbor
for the testator, who, by complying with the formal execution
rules, “assures his estate of routine probate in all but exceptional
circumstances.” 102 All the harmless error rule did was recognize
that “when the testator has made a mistake in complying with
the formalities, it does not follow that the purposes of the Wills
Act have been disserved.” 103 Those purposes—ritual, evidence,
etc.—remained
unquestioned;
it
was
only
the
104
automatic-invalidity rule that was to be altered.

98. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 500 (“Such
fundamental requisites as the testator’s capacity and testamentary intent are
presumed from due execution, subject of course to disproof.”).
99. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 3.
100. See Langbein, Substantial Compliance, supra note 17, at 513
(explaining the function and methods under which the presumption operates).
101. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing these
presumptions).
102. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 4.
103. Id.
104. See id. at 6 (“[A] legal system should be able to preserve relatively high
levels of formality, in order to enhance the safe harbor that is created for the
careful testator who complies fully, without having to invalidate every will in
which the testator does not reach the harbor.”).
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Second, the reformers repeatedly described the mistakes
subject to correction as “innocuous” or “accidental”; 105
paradigmatic examples included situations where one of two
required witnesses left the room to use the lavatory before the
other witness had completed his signature, where a typist
dropped a paragraph, or where a husband and wife each
inadvertently signed the will prepared for the other. 106 Notice
that in all of these situations, the testator has a fixed intent, but
the actions of others, or improper supervision, have caused a
problem. Indeed, the reforms explicitly bar relief for failure to
execute a document or for post-execution changes of mind. 107 The
reforms do not address or remedy irresolution.
Finally, the reforms focus on the interpretation of a
document. The “right question,” under the harmless error reform,
is “whether the document embodies the unequivocal
testamentary intent of the decedent.” 108 What must be
established, “in a clear and convincing manner,” is that “the
testator adopted the document as his or her will.” 109 Uniform
Probate Code section 2-805 only permits reformation of mistaken
105. John H. Langbein, Curing Execution Errors and Mistaken Terms in
Wills, 18 PROB. & PROP., Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 28, 29 [hereinafter Langbein,
Curing Execution Errors]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS &
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b rptr’s note (AM. LAW INST. 2015)
(referring to “innocent” defects).
106. See Langbein, Major Reforms, supra note 60, at 7–10 (listing examples
of cases involving mistaken wills); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS &
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“A will that fails
to comply with one or another of the statutory formalities, and hence would be
invalid if held to a standard of strict compliance with the formalities, may
constitute just as reliable an expression of the intention as a will executed in
strict compliance.”); see also Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra
note 38, at 581 (describing as the “prototypical case of clerical error where the
case for a reformation is so compelling” as one in which “terms [were] deleted or
garbled by a typist”).
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (explaining circumstances under
which relief is barred).
108. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 34; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 3.3 cmt.
b (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“Only a harmless error in executing a document can be
excused under this Restatement.”).
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 3.3 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
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terms contained in a “governing instrument.” 110 The reforms do
not contemplate new, improvisational methods for expressing
testamentary wishes. Rather they adopt a traditional picture of
the testator setting down his considered, final wishes in an
authenticated writing. 111 All that would change is that “harmless
errors” in the execution of that writing, or in its terms, could be
ignored, so long as the intent that the document serve as the
testator’s will is proven by “clear and convincing evidence.”
III. The Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard Applied
Fewer than a dozen states have adopted one or both of the
mistake correction reforms either by statute or judicially. 112 How
many other states will follow is unclear. One factor that may bear
on the choice is experience with the application of the new
provisions in the states that have adopted them. 113 That
110. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-805 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013).
111. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 4 (“If legal
policymakers were put to the choice between a regime of no Wills Act
formalities, on the one hand, versus the Wills Act as traditionally applied on the
other hand, there would be a large consensus in favor of the status quo.”).
112. Ten states have adopted UPC section 2-503 in whole or in part:
California (CAL. PROB. CODE § 6110(c)(2) (West 2015)); Colorado (COLO. REV.
STAT. § 15-11-503 (2014)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:2-503
(LexisNexis 2015)); Michigan (MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2503 (2014)); Montana
(MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (2014)); New Jersey (N.J. STAT. ANN. 3B:3-3 (West
2015)); Ohio (OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.24 (LexisNexis 2015)); South Dakota
(S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-2-503 (2015)); Utah (UTAH CODE ANN. § 72-2-503)
(LexisNexis 2015)); and Virginia (VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-404 (2015)). California
and Ohio limit the harmless error rule to attestation errors, while Colorado and
Virginia exclude almost all signature errors. Six states have adopted UPC
section 2-805: Colorado (COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-806 (2014)); Florida (FLA.
STAT. § 732.615 (2014)); New Mexico (N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-805 (LexisNexis
2014)); North Dakota (N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-05 (2015)); South Carolina
(S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-601(B) (2015)); and Utah (UTAH. CODE ANN. § 75-2-805
(LexisNexis 2015)). Courts in New York have adopted the principles of
Restatement section 12.1. See In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y.
Super. Ct. 2002) (applying principles of Restatement section 12.1 to allow
extrinsic evidence on the issue of intent).
113. I emphasize that this experience is but one factor. As with much of
wills law, little empirical data exists explaining why the reforms have not been
more widely adopted. The reasons might range from legislative inertia to
disagreement about the likelihood that more wills would be contested to
rejection of the concept of the reform.
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experience is sobering. Some courts seem to apply the clear and
convincing evidence standard as the drafters intended—to uphold
wills afflicted with only trivial errors while weeding out
challenges where the evidence is truly mixed and conclusions
about the testator’s intent seem unreliable. Others, however,
have struggled. In one category of cases, courts seem bewildered
by what they need to find clear and convincing evidence of.
Uniform Probate Code section 2-503, for example, requires a high
degree of certainty that the document was intended as decedent’s
will. Courts in these cases have inquired instead whether there is
a high degree of certainty that a particular dispositional outcome
was intended. A second problem involves confusion about what it
means for evidence to be “clear and convincing.” Courts have not
always been careful about the probative value of the evidence on
which they rely. Finally, although the drafters urged appellate
courts to police the clear and convincing evidence requirement
“with rigor,” standards of review—especially review standards
relating to trial courts’ factual findings—are very lenient.
The universe of case law is not particularly large. There is no
way to ascertain whether the cases are typical of disputes arising
around wills generally or mistaken wills particularly. 114 It is
possible that the reforms are working as their proponents
expected, deterring litigation in all but the most contested
cases. 115
114. Even those wills scholars who have relied on sets of reported cases as
data have noted the many distortions in the sample. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch,
Incomplete Wills, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1423, 1430–32 (2013) [hereinafter Hirsch,
Incomplete Wills] (noting that “skewing could result from the data set’s
limitation to decedents whose estates are probated”). See also generally George
L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984) (explaining the general problem of selection effects in studies of
cases).
115. But see Sherwin, supra note 8, at 471 (“Economic models of litigation
and settlement behavior suggest that a high standard of proof will not have a
substantial effect on the volume of disputes actually litigated.”). See also David
Horton, In Partial Defense of Probate: Evidence from Alameda County,
California, 103 GEO. L.J. 605, 629–30 (2015) (explaining that empirical studies
of probated wills in one California county showed high rates of litigation,
suggesting that “probate has become the domain of the messy estate”).
The reformers’ claim that the clear and convincing evidence standard would
deter trivial litigation assumes that potential contestants, familiar with the
newly-reformed law, will decide whether or not to litigate based on a rational
assessment of their chances of prevailing. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless
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That said, if the reforms are meant to correct only
well-evidenced technical defects, the cases are troubling. The
problem derives from the fact that many of the cases depart from
the paradigm the reforms contemplate—a testator with a clearly
formed intent which he has tried to express in a single document,
but who is tripped up by an errant detail of execution or
expression. This testator’s technical mistakes might have an
evidentiary solution. But the testators in the cases that seem
most to trouble the courts have ambiguous, fluid intentions, often
expressed in multiple documents, and their mistakes extend
beyond the narrow bounds of the reforms. Courts are as
concerned to effectuate the intentions of these more tentative
testators as they are the more certain testators the reforms
envision. To achieve this goal, they must push against, and
sometimes overstep, the narrow boundaries of the reforms.
A. Some Benchmark Cases
The paradigm case for applying the will execution reform
rule as the reform’s drafters seem to have envisioned it would
involve a purely technical execution error coupled with virtually
uncontradicted evidence that the noncompliant document was
nonetheless intended as the decedent’s will. In this regard,
consider Estate of Berg. 116 Shirley Berg’s 2003 will was witnessed
by two witnesses and contained an attestation clause creating a
presumption of due execution. 117 Nonetheless, it was undisputed
Errors, supra note 10, at 39 (“[C]ases that arise in well-settled categories of
section 12(2) doctrine would not be litigated under the American pro-waiver
rule, for all the reasons that people do not in general bring hopeless lawsuits.”).
There is little empirical evidence to support the claim that decisions whether or
not to bring will contests are based on assessments of their chances of prevailing
at trial, as opposed to intensity of feelings based on family circumstances. See
generally Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical
Study of How People Approach the Wealth Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J.
325 (2015) (reporting data from interviews that showed that there was more
conflict in remarried and stepparent families than in other families).
116. No. 268584, 2006 WL 2482895 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2006).
117. Id. at *1. On the function of attestation clauses, see DUKEMINIER &
SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 154 (explaining that attestation clauses give rise to a
rebuttable presumption of due execution and may allow a will to be admitted to
probate even if the witnesses predecease the testator or cannot recall the events
of execution).
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that one of the witnesses did not actually see Berg sign the will or
acknowledge her signature as required by the Michigan will
execution statute. 118 Thus, under traditional law, Berg’s will
could not be admitted to probate. 119 But Michigan has adopted
UPC section 2-503, allowing the court to inquire whether the
defect in execution truly raised doubts about Berg’s intent. 120 The
evidence showed that Berg had called the scrivener and told him
that she wanted to update her will, that the newly prepared will
conformed to her instructions, that she told the scrivener that she
no longer wanted the disposition in her prior will, and that she
reviewed and approved the revised will just one or two days
before its execution. 121
The execution defect in Berg is exactly the sort of error to
which the execution reform statute is addressed. The case
involves an attestation mistake, but attestation is, compared to
writing and signature, the least essential formality. 122 Failure to
probate the will made in 2003 would have resulted in the probate
of an earlier will that did not reflect Berg’s current intent. 123 No
118. See Estate of Berg, 2006 WL 2482895, at *1 (detailing the
circumstances surrounding the attestation of the decedent’s will); see also MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2502(1)(c) (West 2015) (describing the attestation
requirements in Michigan).
119. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2502(1) (establishing that “a will is
only valid” if all formalities are respected).
120. Id. § 700.2503.
121. Estate of Berg, 2006 WL 2482895, at *2–3.
122. With respect to the South African experience, Langbein observed that
the case law had produced a “ranking of the Wills Act formalities.” Langbein,
Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 52. “Writing turns out to be
indispensable” because “failure to give permanence to the terms of your will is
not harmless.” Id. “Signature ranks next in importance” because leaving a will
unsigned raises “grievous doubt about the finality and genuineness of the
instrument.” Id. In contrast, attestation makes only a “modest contribution,
primarily of a protective character. But the truth is that most people do not need
protecting, and there is usually strong evidence that want of attestation did not
result in imposition.” Id. The comments to UPC section 2-503 and Restatement
section 3.3 both emphasize and reinforce this de facto hierarchy.
One scholar has argued that the objectives of the will execution reform
would be more effectively achieved simply by abolishing the requirement of
attestation. See James Lindgren, Abolishing the Attestation Requirement for
Wills, 68 N.C. L. REV. 541, 541 (1990) (proposing “abolishing the attestation
requirement altogether”); Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1025 (arguing that
remedying attestation mistakes is the chief goal of the will execution reform).
123. See In re Estate of Berg, No. 268584, 2006 WL 2482895, at *2–3 (Mich.
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one disputed the evidence showing that the newer will exactly
reflected Berg’s final testamentary wishes. 124 Denying probate
would have served no purpose. From a reliability standpoint, the
error was truly innocuous. And that is what the court held. 125 The
case serves as a template, illustrating the paradigmatic
application of Uniform Probate Code section 2-503 to save a will
from needless invalidation on entirely technical grounds.
What makes Berg so appealing in its application of Uniform
Probate Code section 2-503 is clarity of the evidence of both the
mistake and the testator’s intent. But often the evidence is far
murkier. Estate of Windham 126 dealt with a will that Esther Vera
Windham had properly executed on January 17, 2003 devising
her estate to her son. 127 Sometime later, Windham had crossed
out her son’s name on her copy of the will, and written in the
name of her daughter. 128 Surrounding this change, Windham had
written in the will’s margin comments about her family and her
reasoning for making the change. 129 In the weeks prior to her
death, after she altered her copy of the will, she contacted her
attorney and expressed her intention to change the will to benefit
her daughter. 130
Had Windham crossed out her son’s name on the January 17,
2003 will itself, she might have revoked the will by physical
act. 131 But the markings were made on a copy, not on the original
Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2006) (detailing the Court’s findings with respect to the
testator’s intent).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. No. 287937, 2010 WL 293064 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan, 26, 2010).
127. See id. at *1 (detailing the circumstances under which the will was
created and its subsequent changes).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. The trial court apparently considered this theory; the statute providing
for revocation by physical act is cited in the appellate court’s opinion. Estate of
Windham, 2010 WL 293064, at *1. Under this statute, a will may be revoked by
“a revocatory act on the will,” if the testator “performed the [revocatory] act with
the intent and for the purpose of revoking the will or a part of the will.” MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2507(1)(b) (West 2015). The appellate court’s opinion
does not precisely describe the trial court’s reasoning, but there would be no
reason even to consider applying UPC section 2-503 if the will had been revoked
under the revocation statute.
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will, so technically they could not physically revoke it. 132 Again
under traditional law, the inquiry would end there, but because
Michigan had adopted Uniform Probate Code section 2-503(b) 133
the court could consider whether, notwithstanding the technical
problem, Windham’s interlineations were intended as a
revocation of her will. 134 The answer is not entirely clear. Surely
she would not have crossed out her son’s name from the will if
she remained determined that he should receive her estate. On
the other hand, the inclusion of explanatory comments raised the
possibility that, in the court’s words, “she lacked testamentary
intent when she marked up her copy of the original January 17,
2003 will and was only thinking of this marked up copy as a
draft.” 135 Moreover, her conversations with her attorney
subsequent to the alteration could be interpreted to show that she
did not believe she had effectively revoked her will simply by
marking it up, and that she knew she needed to execute a further
document. 136
Windham, then, is quite unlike Berg because the technical
error is not trivial but raises uncomfortable questions about
whether the testator had reached a completely final decision
about disinheriting her son in favor of her daughter. Again,
unlike Berg, the evidence was conflicting and inconclusive. Under
these circumstances, excusing the error and giving legal effect to
her marks might not implement the testator’s wishes. This is
exactly what the trial court found, and the appellate court agreed:
“We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err by finding
that Carr did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that
Windham intended for the marked-up copy of the January 17,
2003, will to result in a revocation of her original January 17,
2003, will.” 137 This case serves as a template opposite to Berg,
132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“The revocatory act must be
performed on the will.”). But see In re Estate of Stoker, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 529
(Cal. App. 2011) (presenting an unusual decision in which revocatory acts
performed on a copy of a will were deemed an effective revocation).
133. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.2503(b) (West 2015).
134. Estate of Windham, No. 287937, 2010 WL 293064, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App.
Jan. 26, 2010).
135. Id.
136. Id. at *2.
137. Id.
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declining to apply Uniform Probate Code section 2-503 where the
error is not innocuous and the evidence is mixed.
Berg and Windham might be seen as benchmark cases. The
attestation error that gave rise to the litigation in Berg was
precisely the sort of meaningless misstep that had in the past led
to unnecessary invalidation of a will the court was confident the
testator wanted. The will execution reform was written precisely
to avoid such a result, and was applied exactly as the reformers
contemplated to permit probate in Berg. But the statute was not
intended to correct all errors. The revocation error that gave rise
to the litigation in Windham was not meaningless, and the
accompanying evidence could not clarify what the testator truly
wanted. The will execution reform was not meant to permit
probate where it is unclear that the testator has come to a settled
conclusion as to her wishes, and thus the court appropriately
declined to apply the statute in Windham. Notice also that the
clear and convincing evidence standard does seem to be doing
some important work in both cases. In Berg, the clarity of the
evidence of both the execution mistake and the Berg’s ultimate
dispositive intention makes it easy to excuse the error. By
contrast, the lack of clarity in Windham is what makes it feel
dangerous to excuse the error. Unfortunately, as we shall see, not
all cases share the qualities of these benchmark decisions.
B. Intending the Will, Intending the Outcome
Charles Kuralt was an iconic TV personality, known for his
“On the Road” stories, for which he traveled America’s back roads
in a mobile home seeking off-beat people and places. 138 He was
also a fraud, carrying on, behind his wife’s back and without her
knowledge, a nearly thirty year affair with a woman known as
Shannon (or, sometimes, as Pat). 139 He and Shannon traveled
together and maintained regular contact; he provided support for

138. See Charles Kuralt, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITTANNICA, http://www.britannica.
com/biography/Charles-Kuralt (last visited Nov. 2, 2015) (offering a short
biography of Charles Kuralt) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
139. See In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 772 (Mont. 1999) (setting out
the facts relevant to the case).
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her and her children, with whom he was also close. 140 In 1985,
Kuralt purchased a twenty-acre parcel of property on the Big
Hole River in Montana, where he and Shannon built a cabin. 141
Subsequently, he purchased the two parcels adjacent to this
property on both the upstream and downstream sides—together
the parcels totaled ninety acres. 142
It appears that Kuralt wanted Shannon to have title to the
Montana property. 143 In 1989, he executed a holographic will in
which he devised Shannon “all my interest in land, buildings,
furnishings and personal belongings on Burma Road, Twin
Bridges, Montana.” 144 The holograph was technically valid in all
respects, 145 but it was revoked by the express revocation clause of
a formal will Kuralt made in 1994. 146 That will devised all of
Kuralt’s real property to his wife, Petie. 147 But Kuralt apparently
remained determined that Shannon receive the Montana
property. In 1997, he deeded Shannon the original 20-acre parcel,
but for secrecy purposes he disguised the gift as a sale; Kuralt
had provided Shannon the funds. 148 Kuralt and Shannon
allegedly agreed on the same procedure for the remaining
acreage, 149 but before that plan could be carried out, Kuralt
became ill and was hospitalized in New York. 150 From there, he
hand wrote a letter that was a gift to the trusts and estates
professors of every American law school. It stated:
June 18, 1997
Dear Pat—
Something is terribly wrong with me and they can’t figure out
what. After cat-scans and a variety of cardiograms, they agree
140. Id. at 772.
141. Id. at 772–73.
142. Id. at 773.
143. Id. at 772.
144. Id.
145. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-2-521, 72-2-522 (2015) (setting out the
requirements for a valid holographic will).
146. In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 773 (Mont. 1999).
147. Id. at 774.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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it’s not lung cancer or heart trouble or blood clot. So they’re
putting me in the hospital today to concentrate on infectious
diseases. I am getting worse, barely able to get out of bed, but
still have high hopes of recovery . . . if only I can get a
diagnosis! Curiouser and curiouser! I’ll keep you informed.
I’ll have the lawyer visit the hospital to be sure you inherit the
rest of the place in MT, if it comes to that.
I send love to you & [your youngest daughter,] Shannon. Hope
things are better there!
Love,
C 151

Kuralt used only his initial, but the Montana Supreme Court
without directly addressing the issue found the “signature” to be
adequate, stating that “Mr. Kuralt’s letter of June 18, 1997 meets
the threshold formal requirements for a valid holographic
will; . . . the letter is entirely in Mr. Kuralt’s handwriting and was
signed by him.” 152 Thus the “only issue” was “whether Mr. Kuralt
possessed the requisite testamentary intent in writing the
letter.” 153 Notice that, had the Court ruled otherwise on the
151. Id.
152. Id. at 772 n.1. There is ample precedent in disputed signature cases for
holding an initial to be a valid signature. See generally, e.g., In re Young, 397
N.E.2d 1223 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); In re Morris’ Estate, 74 Cal. Rptr. 32, 33 (Cal.
App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1969); Trim v. Daniels, 862 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992).
153. In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 772 n.1 (Mont. 1999). Several
scholars have noted that UPC section 2-503’s displacement of the formalities of
will execution will make the existence vel non of testamentary intent the central
issue in many cases—a development troubling in light of the lack of any clear
test for defining or determining testamentary intent. See Kathleen R. Guzman,
Intents and Purposes, 60 KAN. L. REV. 305, 352 (2011)
The need for attention to testamentary intent has become even more
acute over the past two decades. . . . Nowhere is this need more vivid
than in jurisdictions adopting or influenced by the Restatement
(Third) of Property and the Uniform Probate Code, which come
closest to raising intent to a document-determinative position.
Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1018 (“Now that any formality can be dispensed if the
document was intended to be a will, the real limitation will be testamentary
intent.”); Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 39–40) [hereinafter Glover, A
Taxonomy] (“[T]he harmless error rule and the reformation doctrine give courts
significantly more discretion to decide issues of testamentary intent than under
traditional law.”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2590209.
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signature question, it would have had to face virtually the
identical issue under Montana’s version of Uniform Probate Code
section 2-503. The question would be whether, despite technical
non-compliance with the formal requirements, Kuralt intended
the document to be his will. 154
The District Court granted summary judgment to the Estate,
holding that the letter “clearly contemplates a separate
testamentary instrument not yet in existence to accomplish the
transfer of the Montana property,” 155 but the Supreme Court
reversed, finding, in light of the extrinsic evidence of Kuralt’s
intent to make the transfer, that “there arises a question of
material fact as to whether Mr. Kuralt intended, given his state
of serious illness, that the very letter of June 18, 1997, effect a
posthumous disposition of his 90 acres in Madison County.” 156
The District Court, “following an abbreviated evidentiary
hearing” on remand, found that the letter was indeed a valid
holographic codicil to Kuralt’s formal 1994 will. 157 This time the
Montana Supreme Court affirmed. 158 It stated that “the record
supports the District Court’s finding that the June 18, 1997 letter
expressed Kuralt’s intent to effect a posthumous transfer of his
Montana property to Shannon” and that “the June 18, 1997 letter
expressed Kuralt’s desire that Shannon inherit the remainder of
the Montana property.” 159 The Court’s conclusion is plausible,
but—and this was the Court’s gift to trusts and estates
professors—the question of Kuralt’s intent to transfer the
property was not the issue in the case. The issue was, as the
154. See Glover, A Taxonomy, supra note 153, at 24 (distinguishing
“donative” testamentary intent, the intent that the document make a gift
effective at death, from “operative” testamentary intent, “concerned with
whether decedent intended a document that expresses donative intent to be
legally effective”).
155. In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 772 (Mont. 1999).
156. Id. at 776.
157. See In re Estate of Kuralt, 15 P.3d 931, 933 (Mont. 2000) (recounting
the district court’s reevaluation of the evidence that found the letter to be a
valid holographic will displaying testamentary intent).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 933–34. See Glover, A Taxonomy, supra note 153, at 24
(distinguishing “operative” testamentary intent, the intent that a document
have legal effect at death, from “substantive” testamentary intent, “concerned
with identifying the specific gifts that the decedent intended to make”). The
court in Kuralt clearly was not drawing distinctions this fine.
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Court had correctly stated in its first decision, whether the letter
of June 18 was itself intended to transfer the property to
Shannon or, stated otherwise, whether Kuralt intended the letter
to serve as a codicil to his will. Recall that the will execution
reform was not intended to displace the requirement that the
decedent’s testamentary wishes be embodied in an authoritative
document. 160 The issue in Kuralt was whether the letter was that
document. The Kuralt case is infamous for its demonstration of
how easy it is to slide from one question—whether the decedent
intended a document to be his will—to the very different question
of whether the decedent intended a particular dispositive
outcome. 161
Courts are clearly capable of differentiating these questions.
In Estate of Smoke, 162 Clark Smoke made a will in 1977 in which
he left only $1,000 to his son, who was then a young child, with
the remainder left to his siblings. 163 Two different letters written
much later, in 2001 and 2002, expressed Smoke’s view that his
son should receive Smoke’s interest in acreage jointly owned with
Smoke’s two surviving siblings. One, to the siblings, stated, “I feel
that the property should be partitioned in 3 equal parcels . . . to
resolve the issue of who owns what. I am getting older and I want
to avoid any problems of being able to devise my share . . . to my
son.” 164 Neither letter was eligible for probate as a will because
160. Supra notes 98–114 and accompanying text.
161. Another illustration of this slide is In re Estate of Southworth, LC No.
09-046567-DE, 2011 WL 2623381 (Mich. Ct. App. July 5, 2011), a case explicitly
invoking Uniform Probate Code section 2-503. In Southworth, the decedent
made, but did not deliver, a deed giving her farm to petitioner. Id. at *1. The
court found that UPC section 2-503 applied to defects in deeds as well as wills,
and based on the scrivener’s testimony that the decedent had told her she
wanted the farm to go to the petitioner, held that petitioner should receive the
farm property. Id. at *3. “Applying the undisputed factual evidence regarding
decedent’s intent to the plain language of MCL 700.2503,” the Court of Appeals
wrote, “the probate court did not err in concluding that clear and convincing
evidence of decedent’s intent to pass her [farm] to petitioner was presented.” Id.
That may be so, but of course the issue under Uniform Probate Code section
2-503 is not whether the decedent wanted to pass property to the recipient, but
whether she intended a particular document to be the means of passing the
property.
162. No. 2004-675901-DE, 2007 WL 4415499 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2007).
163. See id. at *1 (describing the events and circumstances that led to
litigation).
164. Id.

38

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2016)

neither was properly signed or witnessed. 165 Smoke’s son sought
probate under Uniform Probate Code section 2-503, but the court
held that probate was properly denied. The court noted that “the
proponent of the document must demonstrate that the document
itself represents a valid and more recent testamentary
instrument” and that it is “not enough” that the document
reflects an intent “to someday make changes to his will” or
“abandoned the intent embodied and formalized in the will.” 166
Although the decedent spoke of wanting to be able to devise the
land to his son, “the decedent does not actually purport to devise
anything in the letter.” 167 Under these circumstances, “the
probate court correctly found that respondent had not presented
clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the
letters to replace, amend, or revoke his earlier will.” 168
It might seem overly technical to insist on proof that the
document is intended as the testator’s will, as opposed to proof
that the testator had a particular dispositive wish. 169 But that is
what the drafters of the will execution reform provided. They had
a declared reason for doing as they did. As we have seen, the
reform does not question—but indeed is premised on—the view
that a will properly executed serves as a safe harbor for the
careful testator, who then may cease to worry that the unreliable,
self-serving testimony of others might disturb his formally stated
plan. 170 An unbounded inquiry into the testator’s over-arching
desires could completely disrupt this function. This might have
been true even for Kuralt. Kuralt first devised the Montana
property to Shannon in a holograph. 171 He then made a formal
165. Id. at *2.
166. Id.
167. Id. at *3.
168. Id.
169. But see Guzman, supra note 153, at 361 (arguing, with respect to
testamentary intent, that wills law should “[eliminate] the requirement that the
decedent have intended the precise document proffered to be ‘The Will’”).
170. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at 6 (“[A] legal
system should be able to preserve relatively high levels of formality, in order to
enhance the safe harbor that is created for the careful testator . . . without
having to invalidate every will in which the testator does not reach the
harbor.”).
171. See In re Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d 771, 773 (Mont. 1999) (“In the
event of my death, I bequeath to Patricia Elizabeth Shannon all my interest in
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will that did not mention the Montana property specifically, but
that did have a separate provision for real property—in favor of
his wife. 172 Why? Perhaps the provisions of the formal will were
largely inserted by his lawyer in New York, and Kuralt didn’t feel
able to say much about them lest he expose his long-term affair.
Or perhaps he changed his mind. How can we know? Subsequent
to executing the formal will, Kuralt deeded the original Montana
acreage to Shannon, suggesting he did want her to have at least
that. 173 But the evidence that he was planning to make the same
arrangement for the remaining 90 acres largely came from
Shannon. Her interest is obvious. It is no answer to say that time
simply cut his Kuralt’s gift plan short. Kuralt knew how to write
a holograph clearly and straightforwardly devising property; he
had done so once before. 174 Yet instead he wrote his chatty letter.
Free-form litigation into these questions of Kuralt’s “real” intent
would be less a reform of the Wills Act than an abandonment of
its aspiration that the decedent express his final testamentary
wishes in an authenticated document. Presumably this is why the
will execution reform permits investigation of a testator’s intent
that a document serve as a will, not the testator’s dispositive
intent.
Ambiguity about whether the document was truly intended
as the final will can capture ambiguity about the testator’s final
dispositive intent. Again, Kuralt is illustrative. Kuralt’s final
letter speaks of having his lawyer visit the hospital at an
unspecified future point in time to be sure that Shannon
inherits—presumably via some transaction that the lawyer will
facilitate. 175 Read literally, it does not presently give, devise, or
land, buildings, furnishings and personal belongings on Burma Road, Twin
Bridges, Montana.”).
172. See id. (“I devise all my real property (including any condominium)
which is used by me as a residence or for vacation purposes, together with the
buildings and improvements thereon, if any, to my wife, PETIE, if she shall
survive me.”).
173. See id. at 774 (“On April 9, 1997, Mr. Kuralt deeded his interest in the
original 20—acre parcel with the cabin along the Big Hole River to Shannon.”).
174. See supra note 144 and accompanying text (providing the text of the
holographic will that clearly identifies the property in Montana as meant for
Shannon).
175. See Estate of Kuralt, 981 P.2d at 774 (“I’ll have my lawyer visit the
hospital to be sure you inherit the rest of the place in MT. if it comes to that.”).
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otherwise transfer anything. Kuralt’s earlier holograph, in contrast,
was explicit, stating, “In the event of my death, I bequeath to
Patricia Elizabeth Shannon all my interest in [the Montana
property].” 176 Since Kuralt clearly knew how to draft a document
using language expressing present testamentary intent, it is not
fanciful to think he lacked such intent with respect to the June 18
letter. 177 Thus, a focus on his intent with respect to the documents
alone reveals uncertainty, without resort to a free-form, unlimited
inquiry into his overarching wishes. This, at any rate, seems to be
the design of the statute, which expressly requires “clear and
convincing evidence that the decedent intended the document or
writing to constitute” his will.178 And this is why it is noteworthy
when courts depart from that design, engaging in a very different
inquiry than the statute authorizes.
Another recent and controversial case, In re Estate of
Ehrlich, 179 illustrates the gap between the two approaches and the
potential dangers of moving away from the narrow statutory
question. Richard Ehrlich, who had for fifty years been a trusts and
estates lawyer, died in 2009, survived by a niece and two
nephews.180 He had had no contact with the niece and one of the
nephews for over twenty years, but he had an on-going relationship
with the second nephew, Jonathan, and had told his closest friends
that Jonathan was the person to whom he meant to leave the bulk
of his estate.181 The only testamentary document that could be
located after Richard’s death was a fourteen-page instrument with
Richard’s name and law firm address printed in the margin of each
page. 182 The document made specific cash bequests to the niece and
176. Id. at 773.
177. But see Estate of Harless, 310 P.3d 550, 554 (Mont. 2013) (declining to
probate a letter under section 2-503 because the letter “was not intended to be a
will, nor did it provide for distribution of [the testator’s] assets upon [her]
death”).
178. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013);
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 3.3 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (requiring that the proponent of an improperly
executed will establish “by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
adopted the document as his or her will”).
179. 47 A.3d 12 (N.J. Super Ct. App. Div. 2012).
180. See id. at 13–14 (relating the facts at issue).
181. Id. at 14.
182. Id.
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nephew with whom Richard had been out of contact. 183 Twenty-five
percent of the residue was to pass to a trust for the benefit of a
friend, Kathryn Harris, and the remaining seventy-five percent of
the residue was to pass to Jonathan. 184
Neither Richard nor any witness signed the document. 185 On
the top right-hand corner of the cover page, however, appeared a
notation in Richard’s handwriting: “Original mailed to H.W. Van
Sciver, 5/20/2000.” 186 Harry Van Sciver was named as executor and
trustee in provisions of Richard’s purported will, but he predeceased
Richard “and the original of the document was never returned.” 187
The will could only be probated under UPC section 2-503. 188
Most of the opinion is devoted to the controversial question of
whether the complete absence of a signature renders UPC
section 2-503 inapplicable.189 A vigorous dissent argued that the
reform statute “may be invoked only in a circumstance where the
document ‘was not executed in compliance’ with [the Wills Act]; it
does not apply if the document is not executed at all.” 190 The
majority disagreed, asserting that “the plain language of the
provision . . . expressly contemplates an unexecuted Will within its
scope. Otherwise what is the point of the exception?” 191
This part of the opinion is disputable enough 192 and has
received considerable attention. 193 But in some ways it is the
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (West 2005) (codifying UPC section 2-503).
189. See In re Estate of Ehrlich, 47 A.3d 12, 16–20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2012) (providing the court’s analysis of this central issue).
190. Id. at 20.
191. Id. at 17.
192. Recall the hierarchy of formalities, with the writing and signature at
the apex of importance. Supra note 122 and accompanying text. There is also a
slippery slope issue. See Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors, supra note 10, at
23–24 (“[S]ignature is the formality that permits us to distinguish between
drafts and wills. [If probate of an unsigned will is permitted,] the risk arises
that any unsigned draft, any scrap of paper, can be argued to be an intended,
but unexecuted will.”).
193. See, e.g., Anthony R. La Ratta & Melissa B. Osorio, What’s in a Name?
Writings Intended as Wills, 28 PROB. & PROP. 47, 50–53 (2014) (describing
Ehrlich as “perhaps the most liberal application of the harmless error doctrine
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remainder of the opinion that is more remarkable. According to
the court, Uniform Probate Code section 2-503 requires that the
proponent of a defective instrument prove “by clear and
convincing evidence that the document was in fact reviewed by
the testator, expresses his or her testamentary intent, and was
thereafter assented to by the testator.” 194 However, Uniform
Probate Code section 2-503 does not speak to whether a document
expresses the decedent’s “testamentary intent”; it speaks to
whether the decedent intended a particular document to serve as
his or her will. 195
As in Kuralt, the difference is not simply technical. The court
in Ehrlich noted that the will’s main beneficiary, Jonathan, “was
the natural object of decedent’s bounty” 196 and that “in the years
following the drafting of [the defective document], and as late as
2008, decedent repeatedly orally acknowledged and confirmed the
dispositionary contents therein to those closest to him.” 197 Thus,
“the unrefuted proof is that the decedent intended Jonathan to be
the primary, if not exclusive, beneficiary of his estate, an
objective the purported will effectively accomplishes.” 198 Even
though there was unrefuted testimony that Richard wanted to
eliminate the provision in favor of Kathryn, and even though the
document “is only a copy of the original will sent to decedent’s
executor,” 199 the court held that it was properly admitted to
probate because any other outcome would have been
“intent-defeating.” 200
to date”).
194. Id. at 18. The requirement that the document have been reviewed by
the testator derives from In re Macool, 3 A.3d 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2010). See infra notes 162–175 and accompanying text (discussing In re Macool).
Both cases are criticized in Glover’s A Taxonomy of Testamentary Intent. Glover,
A Taxonomy, supra note 153, at 41–48.
195. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2013) (“[T]he document or writing is treated as if it had been executed in
compliance with that section if the proponent of the document or writing
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the
document or writing to constitute: 1) the decedent’s will . . . .”).
196. In re Estate of Ehrlich, 47 A.3d 12, at 18. (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2012).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 19.
200. Id.
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If the document was only a copy—and that indeed is what it
was—then Ehrlich could not have intended that document to be
his will. 201 Had there not been evidence of a change of heart about
the gift to Kathryn, it would be tempting to ignore this
problem. 202 But because there was unrebutted evidence that
Ehrlich had changed his mind about at least part of the will, it is
difficult to agree that the evidence was clear and convincing that
he wanted this exact document to be probated. What the court
seems to be saying is that the disposition in the purported will
comes closer to effectuating Ehrlich’s intent than would intestacy,
under which Jonathan would take no more than the disfavored
niece and nephew.
The execution reform statute’s framing of the issue—whether
the decedent intended the disputed writing to constitute his
will—ties the court’s inquiry about intent to a particular
instrument. Without that focus, the inquiry risks becoming
almost completely detached from anything about the document
before the court and, if Ehrlich is in any way typical,
correspondingly unbounded in scope. Asking whether a given
document was intended as a will is quite different from asking
whether the decedent would probably prefer its disposition to
intestacy. Under that test, any draft could be offered as a will, as
could virtually any earlier revoked will, as these documents in
most cases show a dispositive intent different from the outcome
supplied by the intestacy statues. We could have wills law that
asks directly about what outcome might best approximate the
testator’s dispositive intent: probate of the will, intestacy, or
reformation of terms. However, the history, language, and
201. Ironically, as noted by the dissent, there are rules under which copies of
lost wills can be probated, and the facts might have supported probating the will
under those rules here. Id. at 24 (Skillman, J., dissenting). As the dissenting
judge explained, “Although N.J.S.A. 3B:3-3 does not authorize the admission to
probate of the unexecuted copy . . . there is common law doctrine under which a
copy of a lost will may be admitted to probate if the party seeking probate can
present satisfactory evidence of the original will’s contents . . . .” Id. at 24. The
dissent would have remanded for further findings on whether the common law
requirements had been met. See id. (discussing what steps would have been
taken going forward by the dissent).
202. To some extent the court did ignore it. Even after noting that Ehrlich
“wished to delete the bequest to his former friend, Kathryn Harris,” id. at 14
(majority opinion), the court asserted that the unexecuted document “accurately
reflects his final testamentary wishes.” Id. at 19.
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comments to the reform provisions all confirm that wholesale
change of this sort was not what was intended. 203 Again, the
purpose of the reforms was to deal with minor, “harmless” errors
in the expression of fixed and specific intentions, not to create a
new law of wills that would permit wide-ranging inquiries about
general donative intent. 204
Yet, as these cases show, the courts do inquire. In terms of
the evidentiary considerations that animate the wills law
reforms, Kuralt and Ehrlich alike are “mistakes” and go well
beyond the reforms’ literal boundaries. Yet it is hard to fault the
courts for trying to carry out the wishes of these testators. Their
errors do not line up precisely with the terms of the reforms, but
that is because they are not the sort of testators the reforms
contemplate. They do not have one, fixed intent that their wills
inadvertently fail to express. Rather, they are ambivalent and
change their minds over time; they cannot quite get to closure.
The reforms, applied literally, will not help them. But the courts
do not seem to accept the reforms’ limits. Instead, they push
beyond those limits to respond to those testamentary intentions
that can be discerned, even though they are not the intentions
the reforms contemplate.
C. Clear, but Convincing?
There is no agreed upon formula encapsulating what is “clear
and convincing evidence.” Here are some sample statements. The
evidence must be “so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as
to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitancy, of the precise facts in issue.” 205 “Clear and convincing
evidence is more than a mere preponderance; it is highly probable
evidence free from serious or substantial doubt.” 206 “Clear and
convincing evidence is that amount of evidence which produces in
203. See Part II.C supra (examining the development of the will execution
and mistake correction reforms in wills law).
204. See supra Part II.C (explaining the limited scope of the reforms).
205. In re Estate of Hoch, No. 09-00532, 2012 WL 1379846, at *5 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 23, 2012) (quoting In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 74
(1993)).
206. In re Estate of Wilfong, 148 P.3d. 465, 468 (Colo. App. 2006).
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the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence of a
fact to be proved.” 207
It is common, however, for courts to vary in their formulation
and expression of a legal standard. No evidentiary standard can
define itself; all are indeterminate to some degree. Still, the idea
behind requiring clear and convincing evidence seems intuitive
enough; the factfinder need not be absolutely certain, but highly
confident, about the fact in issue. 208 Unfortunately, courts often
fail to explain fully why they are so confident about the evidence
before them, and thus it is not clear how well the clear and
convincing evidence standard is functioning as an evidentiary
safeguard.
In re Estate of Hall 209 is a “textbook” case illustrating the
power of UPC section 2-503 in the case of botched will
executions. 210 In June 1997, Jim Hall and his second wife, Betty
Lou Hall, met with their lawyer, Ross Cannon, to discuss the
terms of a joint will. 211 The joint will, once executed, would
supersede an earlier will that Jim executed in 1984 in favor of his
207.

In re Isvik, 741 N.W.2d 638, 648 (Neb. 2007); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
12.1 cmt. e, rptr’s n.6 (AM. LAW
of the “clear and convincing
evidence” standard in various jurisdictions).
208. “Absolute certainty about the truth of assertions can seldom be
established,” and thus we can only be more or less confident or seek “a higher
degree of probability” than would be attained under the conventional
preponderance standard. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2015). The literature on
burdens of proof has variously described the functions of proof burdens in terms
of confidence, probability, and the allocation of error and risk. See, e.g., Ronald
J. Allen, How Presumptions Should Be Allocated—Burdens of Proof,
Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 627, 641 (1994) (discussing allocation of the risk of error between
litigants); Neil B. Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a
World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 389–94 (1985) (discussing
the current body of literature concerning the application of probability theory to
the proof process); J. P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALIF. L.
REV. 242, 251–54 (1944) (discussing confidence levels).
209. 51 P.3d 1134 (Mont. 2002).
210. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 185 (utilizing Hall to
illustrate the operation of UPC section 2-503); STEWART E. STERK ET AL., ESTATES
AND TRUSTS 243 (4th ed. 2011) (utilizing Hall to illustrate the practical effects of
UPC section 2-503).
211. See Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d at 1135 (reciting the factual scenario
considered by the court).
OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS §
INST. 2015) (listing additional interpretations
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daughters from a previous marriage. 212 “After making several
changes” to a draft the lawyer had sent them, “Jim and Betty
apparently agreed on the terms of the Joint Will” and were
prepared to execute it “once Cannon sent them a final draft.” 213
Before the changes were finalized, the meeting ended, at which
time “Jim asked Cannon if the draft could stand as a will until
Cannon sent them a final version.” 214 Cannon replied that the
will “would be valid if Jim and Betty executed the draft and he
notarized it.” 215 No one else was in the office at the time to serve
as an attesting witness. 216 Thus, Jim and Betty signed the will
and Cannon notarized it. 217 Jim died in October 1998 without
executing any further testamentary documents. 218
In the absence of the witnesses required under the applicable
Montana wills act, 219 the will could be probated only under UPC
section 2-503. 220 The court found the evidence that Jim intended
the marked up document to be his final will to be clear and
convincing. 221 It relied on the Joint Will’s specific revocation of all
earlier wills and on Jim’s instruction, when Jim and Betty
returned from Cannon’s office, that Betty should physically
destroy the earlier, 1984, will. 222 It also relied on the following
colloquy, in which Betty testified:
Question: Do you know if [Jim] gave [Sandra and Charlotte,
Jim’s daughters] a copy of the new will?

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. Under UPC section 2-502(a)(3), notarized wills are valid without
witnesses. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3) (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2013). However, this provision has not been added to Montana’s will
execution statute; it certainly was not in effect in Montana when Hall was
decided.
218. Id.
219. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-522(c) (West 2015) (requiring the
signatures of two individuals who witnessed the testator’s signing of the same
document).
220. MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-523.
221. In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d 1134, 1136 (Mont. 2002).
222. Id.
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Answer: I don't believe he did, no.
Question: Do you know why?
Answer: Well, I guess because we didn't have the completed
draft without all the scribbles on it.
Question: So he thought that will was not good yet?
Answer: No, he was sure it was good, but he didn't give it to
the girls. And we didn't give it to my son. We didn't give it to
anybody.
Question: Why?
Answer: Because it wasn't completely finished the way Ross
was going to finish it. 223

The court acknowledged that “all the scribbles” left Betty in
doubt that the will was yet in final form, but dismissed this doubt
in light of her later statement that “[Jim] was sure it was
good.” 224 The court added that “[w]hen asked if it were Jim’s and
her intent for the Joint Will to stand as a will until they executed
another one, she responded, ‘Yes, it was.’” 225 Moreover, “Sandra
points to no other evidence that suggests that Jim did not intend
for the Joint Will to be his will.” 226 Based on this evidence, the
Montana Supreme Court affirmed the District Court’s decision to
admit the document to probate. 227
The evidence is more mixed than the court acknowledged. On
one side, the lawyer told Jim and Betty that the marked up
document would be valid if signed and notarized. 228 On that
basis, apparently, Jim had Betty destroy the earlier will, which
was also expressly revoked in the later document. 229 Betty
testified that Jim intended the will to stand until they executed
another one. 230 But on the other side, Betty also testified, in a
part of the colloquy the court ignored, that Jim and Betty did not
give the document to their children because “we didn’t have the
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1135.
Id.
Id. at 1136.
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completed draft” and “it wasn’t completely finished the way Ross
was going to finish it.” 231 This testimony is consistent with the
fact that Jim referred to the document as “a draft” that was not
the “final version.” 232 And while Betty testified that it was Jim’s
intent as well as her own that the Joint Will should stand, her
interest makes her a somewhat unreliable narrator on that point.
Only Jim could testify altogether reliably about his intent, and of
course—and this is what makes these cases so hard—he was not
available at the trial to clarify his intentions.
If the question at hand were “could a court credibly decide
that Jim intended the mark up as his will?,” the answer almost
certainly would be “yes.” But the question at hand is whether (to
recur to the formulations with which this section began) the
evidence is clear enough to enable a court “to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitancy,” 233 of Jim’s intent or whether the
evidence is “free from serious or substantial doubt” 234 or produces
“in the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction about the existence
of a fact to be proved.” 235 The court simply did not address some
of the more discomforting possibilities raised by the evidence.
Perhaps Jim left the marked-up will alone because of his
attorney’s assurances. However, thinking in a slightly different
way, can we be confident that Jim did not have second thoughts
about benefitting his daughters? Quite a while passed between
the execution of the mark up, in June, and Jim’s death, in
October, but this cuts two ways. Perhaps he never formally
executed the will because he thought it unnecessary in light of
what had been done in June. But perhaps he never formally
executed the will because he did not want to finalize it. Neither
the trial nor the appellate court seems to have considered these
possibilities; certainly they do not appear in the opinion.
The same lack of explicit attention to potentially
countervailing evidence can be seen in In re Estate of Herceg, 236
231. Id. (emphasis added).
232. Id.
233. In re Estate of Hoch, No. 09-00532, 2012 WL 1379846, at *5 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 23, 2012) (quoting In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 74
(1993)).
234. In re Estate of Wilfong, 148 P.3d 465, 468 (Colo. App. 2006).
235. In re Isvik, 741 N.W.2d 638, 648 (Neb. 2007).
236. 747 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2002).
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which involves the reformation of a will for mistake. Eugenia
Herceg’s 1999 will contained a residuary clause, but the clause
named no beneficiary. 237 Her prior will’s residuary clause devised
the residue to her nephew Sergio or, if he failed to survive her, to
Sergio’s wife Columba. 238 Sergio predeceased the testator, and
Columba petitioned “for construction of the will by reading the
residuary clause to be the same as decedent’s prior will.” 239 The
attorney who drafted the 1999 will offered evidence that when
the earlier will was redrafted in 1999 a computer glitch caused
“some lines from the residuary clause” to be “accidentally
deleted.” 240
“Obviously a mistake has been made,” the court noted. 241 The
question was whether the mistake could be corrected given the
traditional law barring unattested extrinsic evidence. 242 The
court found itself facing a conflict between “two long-standing
policies of the Law of Wills” one of which would prevent it from
supplying via extrinsic evidence “what the testator has not,” and
the other of which required it “to ascertain the intention of the
testator to avoid intestacy.” 243 Relying primarily on the
permits
Restatement
reform—then
in
draft 244—that
consideration of “any evidence of testator’s intent, but raising the
standard of proof from a preponderance of the evidence to clear
and convincing evidence,” 245 the court decided that it could indeed
consider extrinsic evidence. 246
237. See id. at 902 (examining the conflicting clauses in Herceg’s wills).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id. at 903.
242. See id. (“The difficulty in this case is that there is a line of cases holding
that where the name of the beneficiary is missing it cannot be supplied by
construction or reformation of the will. . . . [E]xtrinsic evidence cannot be
admitted unless there is an ambiguity in the will.”).
243. Id.
244. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1
(AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 1, 2003).
245. In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901, 904 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2002).
246. The court also considered some New York case law, but admitted that
its holding was “a significant step beyond” the cited cases. Id at 904–05.
“Nevertheless,” wrote the court, “it seems logical . . . to choose the
path . . . recommended by the Restatement in order to achieve the dominant
purpose of carrying out the intent of the testator.” Id. at 905.
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Five facts were adduced in support of the court’s conclusion
that “the evidence is clear and convincing that Columba
Pastorino is the intended beneficiary of the residuary” of Herceg’s
estate. 247 First, not only did the residuary clause of Herceg’s prior
will give the residue to Colomba if Sergio failed to survive, but
the residuary clauses of two earlier wills contained an identical
residuary disposition. 248 Second, Herceg had named Columba as
alternative executrix in her will, demonstrating that “Columba
had not fallen out of favor with the testatrix and been
deliberately removed from the residue.” 249 Third, one of Herceg’s
intestate heirs, a niece, who would take if the residuary clause
failed, consented to the requested reformation, and was willing to
acknowledge that the omission of a name in the residuary clause
was a typographical error. 250 Fourth, the attorney-scrivener’s
affidavit stated that “Mrs. Herceg’s express intent was to
continue the remainder of her property distribution as it was in
the previous will.” 251 Finally, there is a legal presumption against
intestacy, especially with respect to residuary clauses. 252
This evidence could have been examined more critically than
the case reflects. The residuary clauses of Herceg’s prior wills
reflect the intent she had when she wrote those wills. But she
wrote a new will in 1999, 253 presumably because she had changed
her mind with respect to some devises in her earlier wills. We
cannot be sure whether her intent with respect to the residue
remained constant. The fact that Columba was retained as
alternative executrix shows only that Herceg had not changed her
mind about Columba in that role. We still cannot be certain
whether Herceg changed her mind with respect to the residue.
The niece’s testimony, self-sacrificing as it may be, is irrelevant to
the question at hand; without more information about her
relationship to Herceg, it is impossible to determine what she can
reliably tell us about Herceg’s wishes. Nor is the attorney entirely
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 905.
Id.
Id. at 903.
Id. at 902.
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reliable, as he might support Columba’s interpretation in order to
avert a lawsuit that could otherwise arise out of his negligence in
failing to complete the residuary clause. The presumption against
intestacy is not a fact at all, and even if Herceg did intend to die
testate, the presumption tells us nothing about whom she might
have wanted to take her residuary estate.
If the purpose of the clear and convincing evidence standard
is to produce an especially careful, searching inquiry about
will-making errors, the Hall and Herceg courts’ reluctance to
consider or discuss alternative interpretations of the evidence is
disquieting. Recall that one function of the clear and convincing
evidence standard is to impose a higher sense of responsibility on
the judge. 254 The reforms contemplate that the judge will respond
“by rendering a thorough, reasoned set of findings that deal with
the relevant contested facts.” 255 But in neither Hall nor Herceg
does the court actually discuss the full range of possibilities
presented by the evidence, raising questions whether the
standard is functioning as intended to force the trial judge “to do
an especially careful job.” 256
Some courts appear to take more care. Consider In re
Macool, 257 a case with some similarities to Hall and Herceg. 258
Louise Macool executed a will in 1995 in which she named her
husband as the sole beneficiary and her step-children and
step-grandchildren as contingent beneficiaries. 259 In 2007 she
executed a codicil in which she named as contingent co-executors
different step-children than had been named in the 1995 will. 260
254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (positing that the clear and
convincing standard “imposes a heightened sense of responsibility on the trier of
fact”).
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. 3 A.3d 1258 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010).
258. There are, as we will see, also differences. It is unclear whether Macool
is exactly parallel to any other decision given the court’s statement that “the
facts underlying this case are so uniquely challenging that they have the feel of
an academic exercise, designed by a law professor to test the limits of a
student’s understanding of probate law.” Id. at 1261.
259. See id. (recounting the various steps taken by Macool in her attempts to
plan the division of her estate).
260. Id. at 1262.
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Less than a month after her husband’s death in 2008, she went to
her lawyer’s office “with the intent of changing her will.” 261 She
provided the lawyer a handwritten note covering many specific
wishes, almost none of which were described in terms
immediately comprehensible to anyone other than Louise. 262 But
her lawyer discussed the issues with Louise, “using her
handwritten notes as a guide,” 263 and in her presence dictated a
new will. 264 The lawyer’s secretary then typed a draft of the
will. 265 Louise left the lawyer’s office to have lunch, and the
lawyer expected her to make an appointment to review the draft,
but—another fact delighting trusts and estates professors
everywhere—she died an hour later without ever seeing the draft
will. 266
Even had its instructions been entirely clear, the
handwritten note could not be probated as a holographic will
because it lacked a signature. 267 The typed will also lacked both
signature and witnesses, and thus it, too, could not be probated
as a formal will. 268 It was argued that the draft should
261. Id. at 1261–62.
262. The note read:
get the same as the family Macool gets
Niece
Mary Rescigno [indicating address] If any thing happen[s] to Mary
Rescigno[,] her share goes to he[r] daughter Angela Rescigno. If
anything happen[s] to her it goes to her 2 children. 1. Nikos Stylon 2.
Jade Stylon
Niece + Godchild LeNora Distasio [indicating address] if anything
happe[ns] to [her] it goes back in the pot
I [would] like to have the house to be left in the family Macool.
I [would] like to have.
1. Mike Macool [indicating address]
2. Merle Caroffi [indicating address]
3. Bill Macool [indicating address]
Take
Id. at 1262.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1264.
268. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-2(a)(3) (West 2005) (requiring two witnesses
to sign the document).

IRRESOLUTE TESTATORS

53

nonetheless be admitted to probate under UPC § 2-503. 269 In
addressing this claim, the court conceded that “the record clearly
and convincingly shows that decedent intended to alter her
testamentary plan.” 270 But that did not conclude the analysis
whether there was “evidence establishing, by clear and
convincing evidence, that decedent intended the draft will
prepared by [the attorney] to constitute her binding and final
will.” 271 Although the draft “substantially reflect[ed]” Louise’s
handwritten notes, 272 the attorney had included some of the
designated contingent beneficiaries, but had omitted others. 273 In
addition, he had sought to implement the note’s instruction to
“have the house to be left in the family Macool,” but he testified
that he was unsure whether he had accurately captured her
wishes. 274 Louise had not specifically accepted any of these
provisions. 275 Under the circumstances, the court could not
“conclude, with any degree of reasonable certainty, that [the
attorney’s] approach would have met with decedent’s
approval.” 276 Thus, the trial court had been correct in
determining that there was “insufficient evidence from which to
conclude that decedent intended the particular draft document
that [her attorney] prepared to be her will.” 277
Macool is not a total match with either Hall or Herceg. The
testators in Hall did review the changes the lawyer made to their
269. See In re Macool, 3 A.3d 1258, 1264 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010)
(“We next address plaintiff's argument that under N.J.S.A. 3B:3–3, the draft
will should be admitted because there is clear and convincing evidence that
decedent intended this document to constitute her will, or alternatively, a
partial revocation of her prior will.”) (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-3 (codifying
Unif. Probate Code section 2-503)).
270. Id. at 1264.
271. Id. In this part of the opinion, the court drew exactly the distinction
that the courts in Kuralt and similar cases failed to make between “evidence
showing decedent’s general disposition to alter her testamentary plans” and
evidence establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that decedent intended
an identified document, in this case the draft will “to constitute her binding and
final will.” Id.
272. Id. at 1262.
273. Id. at 1264.
274. Id. at 1265.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 1263.
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will, whereas Louise Macool did not. 278 The problem in Herceg
was a simple omission, whereas the draft in Macool may have
included terms of which Louise might have disapproved. The
lawyer in Macool conceded uncertainty about whether he had
accurately implemented Louise’s instructions, whereas the
lawyers in the other cases seemed confident that they had (in
Hall) or that they knew how they had failed (in Herceg). 279
But all three cases ultimately turn on whether the evidence
of the decedent’s intent with respect to the document in question
is clear and convincing. This analysis requires not just an
enumeration of facts, but a consideration of what they do—and do
not—tell us about the testator’s perception of the document. The
court in Macool could have chosen to discuss or emphasize only
those facts showing how the dictated will would have carried out
the main points in Louise’s notes or, in the alternative, those
showing how the overall design of the will would have
implemented those of her wishes that could actually be discerned.
But the court was careful not to do so, and equally careful in
evaluating the gaps in what the evidence showed. If the clear and
convincing evidence standard is to act as a real safeguard in the
implementation of UPC section 2-503 and UPC section 2-805, we
should expect courts to confront as honestly as in Macool the
weaknesses of the evidence offered.
And yet the outcomes of Hall and Herceg are by no means
absurd and, even if their reasoning is on the thin side, it is hard
to argue that the cases are wrongly decided. Why do they not feel
more controversial? One reason is that the level of formality in
both cases was quite high. The will in Hall was notarized, which
278. The court in Macool concluded that a writing can be admitted to
probate as a will under New Jersey’s codification of UPC section 2-503 only if
“(1) the decedent actually reviewed the document in question; and (2) thereafter
gave his or her final asset to it.” Id. at 1265. For a critique of this holding, see
Glover, A Taxonomy, supra note 153, at 42.
279. See In re Macool, 3 A.3d 1258, 1262 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010)
(mentioning that the lawyer who drafted the codicil in question indicated that
the document was a rough draft, subject to review); In re Estate of Hall, 51 P.3d
1134, 1135 (Mont. 2002) (noting that the lawyer who drafted Mr. Hall’s will
believed that the draft would be valid if it was signed and notarized, even in the
absence of attesting witnesses); In re Estate of Herceg, 747 N.Y.S.2d 901, 903
(N.Y. Super. Ct. 2002) (describing an affidavit from Ms. Herceg’s lawyer, who
drafted the will in question, which acknowledges a computer “glitch” that
caused the deletion of lines from the residuary clause).
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under today’s UPC would have validated the will even in the
absence of witnesses. 280 Herceg’s will was properly executed. A
second reason is that both cases involve scrivener errors, not
mistakes by hapless testators who were indifferent or oblivious to
the requirements for valid wills. Third, the testators in Hall and
Herceg both come closer than Louise Macool to the paradigm
contemplated by both the will execution and the mistake
correction reforms. The testators seem to have reached final
conclusions about the disposition of their property, endeavored to
have embodied those decisions in an authoritative document, and
were frustrated in achieving their ends only by circumstances out
of their control. Paradoxically, the closer the testator conforms to
the paradigm, the less careful the courts seem to be about openly
confronting evidentiary weaknesses. Yet, if these three facts are
determinative, it’s hard to see what work the clear and
convincing evidence standard is doing. It seems possible that the
testators’ conformity to the will-making paradigm is more
important to the outcome of these cases than the evidentiary
standard.
D. Policing the Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard
Over time, courts might more honestly confront the quality of
the evidence before them if appellate courts scrutinized their
factual findings and reversed those that were under-analyzed.
The Comment to UPC section 2-503 explicitly encourages
appellate courts to police the clear and convincing evidence
standard “with rigor.” 281 However, appellate review is unlikely to
have much effect on lower court fact-finding because of the

280. See supra note 143 and accompanying text (noting that the absence of a
witness does not invalidate a notarized will under UPC section 2-502(a)(3)).
281. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-503 cmt. (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2013)
By placing the burden of proof upon the proponent of a defective
instrument, and by requiring the proponent to discharge that burden
by clear and convincing evidence (which courts at the trials and
appellate levels are urged to police with rigor), Section 2-503 imposes
procedural standards appropriate to the seriousness of the issue.
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relatively low standard of review applicable in many of the
decisions. 282
As with the definition of “clear and convincing evidence,”
courts differ in their formulations of the appropriate standard of
review on appeal, some requiring that the trial court’s conclusion
be “not clearly erroneous,” 283 and others requiring that it be
supported by “competent substantial evidence.” 284 The procedural
posture may matter, especially where a case has been decided by
summary judgment in the court below. 285 And courts may
distinguish between matters of law or of equity, both reviewable
“de novo,” 286 and issues of fact, reviewable on a more deferential
282. On the general problem of appellate review of probate litigation, see
John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2044 (1994) (reviewing
DAVID MARGOLICK, UNDUE INFLUENCE: THE EPIC BATTLE FOR THE JOHNSON AND
JOHNSON FORTUNE (1993))
The risk of error or worse in American probate adjudication is not
adequately offset by the prospect of appellate review. Because the
presumption of correctness that attaches to the trial court’s findings
of fact is so difficult to overcome on appeal, [surrogate court judges
have] little to fear. . . . On the Continent, by contrast, the
disappointed civil litigant is entitled to review de novo, with no
presumption of correctness below. Because review in these systems is
retrial, the damage that an arbitrary, ignorant, or corrupt trial judge
can cause is significantly reduced.
283. See In re Estate of Windham, No. 287937, 2010 WL 293064, at *1
(Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010) (“The standard of review of findings of fact made
by a probate court sitting without a jury is whether those findings are clearly
erroneous.”); see also In re Gentile Trust, No. 289809, 2010 WL 4137450, at *6
(Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2010) (reviewing the probate court’s factual findings for
“clear error”).
284. See Morey v. Everbank, 93 So. 3d 482, 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(explaining that it is not the appellate court’s function to conduct a de novo
review of the evidence, but simply to “determine whether there exists in the
record competent substantial evidence to support the judgment of the trial
court”); Reid v. Sonder, 63 So. 3d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (“[I]n this case,
it is not our function to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, but simply to
determine whether there exists in the record competent substantial evidence to
support the judgment of the trial court.”).
285. See, e.g., In re Leach, No. 304688, 2012 WL 4900516, at *1 (Mich. Ct.
App. Oct. 16, 2012) (“We review de novo a probate court’s ruling on a motion for
summary disposition.”).
286. See Purcella v. Olive Kathyrn Purcella Trust, 325 P.3d 987, 991 (Alaska
2014) (“[T]he superior court’s application of law to fact is reviewed de novo”); In
re O’Donnell, 815 N.W.2d 640, 644 (Neb. Ct. App. 2012) (“Where an equity
question is presented, appellate review of that issue is de novo.”).
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standard such as “clear error.” 287 Sometimes courts find an issue
such as the appropriateness of trust reformation to involve mixed
questions of law and fact and purport to apply one standard (de
novo) to the lower court’s legal conclusions and a separate
standard (clear error) to its findings of fact. 288
Courts in some cases have been quite clear that the
requirement of clear and convincing evidence does not affect the
standard of review: “even where proof of a fact in the trial court is
required by clear and convincing evidence, the standard for
appellate review is substantial evidence.” 289 This requires
deference to the trial court, so “if there is a conflict in the
evidence bearing on the question of decedent’s intent, or in the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, we are bound by
the trial court’s determination of that conflict.” 290 This deference
is all the stronger where the issue involves the credibility of
witnesses: “We ‘grant particular deference to the trial court’s
factual findings when they are based primarily on oral testimony,
because the trial court, not this court, performs the function of
judging the credibility of witnesses and weighing conflicting
evidence.’” 291 This strong deference could affect the operation of
287. See Purcella, 325 P.3d at 991 (“We review the superior court’s findings
of fact for clear error.”). On the history of the separate standards of review in
law and in equity, see generally Charles E. Clark & Ferdinand F. Stone, Review
of Findings of Fact, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190–217 (1937).
288. Purcella, 325 P.3d at 991; see also In re Estate of Southworth, No.
297460, 2011 WL 2623381, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. July 5, 2011) (reviewing the
probate court’s analysis of a will’s language “de novo as a question of law,” but
also noting that when the probate court engages in factfinding, a clear error
standard of review is applied).
289. In re Estate of Lara, No. H039060, 2014 WL 2108962, at *6 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 20, 2014); see also KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 340 (7th ed. 2013) (anticipating the problem of substantial error
review in cases where the standard of proof is clear and convincing error).
290. Lara, 2014 WL 2108962, at *6 (quoting In re Estate of Beebee, 258 P.2d
1101, 1105 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953)); see also Gassmann Revocable Living Tr.
v. Reichert, 802 N.W.2d 889, 892 (N.D. 2011) (“[E]ven when reviewing findings
made under a clear and convincing evidence standard, determination of the
credibility of witnesses is a function of the trial court.”).
291. Purcella v. Purcella Tr., 325 P.3d 987, 991 (Alaska 2014) (quoting Day
v. Williams, 285 P.3d 256, 260 (Alaska 2012)); see also In re Estate of Windham,
No. 287937, 2010 WL 293064, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010) (“[T]he
reviewing court will defer to the probate court on matters of credibility, and will
give broad deference to findings of fact . . . because of the probate court’s unique
vantage point regarding witnesses [and] their testimony.”).

58

73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2016)

the UPC and Restatement reforms because, as is evident from the
case descriptions in this Article, decisions involving the reforms
often turn on the testimony of witnesses who (allegedly) heard
the decedent talk about his estate plan, were present when the
will was executed, received letters from the decedent, or
otherwise have become privy to information possibly relating
either to the decedent’s circumstances or wishes. In theory,
appellate courts could ensure that lower courts applied the clear
and convincing standard, while still deferring to lower court
credibility determinations. In practice, this may be a tricky line to
draw.
It is difficult to tell from the small number of cases explicitly
considering the standard of appellate review how great a role
deference will play. In one case raising the issue of whether the
creator of a trust revoked it by mistake, meaning only to change
the trustee, the appellate court, employing a “de novo” review
standard, reached an “independent conclusion as to whether
there was clear and convincing evidence” about whether the
settlor’s unambiguous language of revocation accurately reflected
her intent. 292 The higher court found the evidence of intent to be
“at least evenly balanced.” 293 Thus “even taking into
consideration that the trial court saw and heard the testimony of
witnesses,” 294 the court on appeal reversed the lower court’s
decision finding that the trust was not revoked. 295 This approach
seems entirely consistent with the mistake correction reform,
which counsels caution against reformation unless the mistake is
proven to a high degree of confidence—confidence that is more
difficult to attain if the evidence is truly mixed.
Some of the appellate cases contain statements that seem at
odds with the reformers’ concept of appellate review, even where
292. See In re Isvik, 741 N.W.2d 638, 648 (Neb. 2007) (analyzing whether a
letter signed and mailed by the settlor to the Bank, which unambiguously stated
that she was revoking her trust, was actually intended only to discharge the
Bank as trustee, and therefore the revocable trust should be subject to
reformation based upon mistake).
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. See id. (concluding that “the county court erred in reforming the
unambiguous written notice of revocation which Isvik submitted to the
trustee”).
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the outcomes do not. In Purcella v. Olive Kathryn Purcella
Trust, 296 Kathryn Purcella sought in 2010 to reform an
irrevocable trust she had created in 2009, arguing that the trust
instrument did not conform to her original intent. 297 Multiple
witnesses—including one of her children, a daughter-in-law, and
two different lawyers—testified that Kathryn “understood the
effect of the trust at the time it was executed.” 298 The court below
found these witnesses’ testimony “more credible than
Kathryn’s,” 299 and thus denied the reformation. The appellate
court affirmed, stating: “Because we give deference to the
superior court’s credibility determinations, the fact that
Kathryn’s testimony contradicted the testimony of these other
witnesses is not a sufficient basis for finding clear error.” 300
Again, the outcome seems entirely consistent with the
reformation statute; if the evidence conflicts, it is not “clear and
convincing.” Yet the appellate court’s talk of deference seems
inconsistent with the idea of “rigorous” review. Had the lower
court found Kathryn’s testimony to be more credible than the
other witnesses, would the appellate court have deferred to that
factual finding, and upheld a trust reformation even though the
evidence conflicted?
The same question arises in Reid v. Sonder. 301 Here, Sonder’s
trust, to be funded by a pour-over from his testate estate,
provided that “after giving effect” to enumerated charitable gifts,
his nurse Cecilia Reid was to receive a cash gift of $25,000 and
Sonder’s apartment. 302 There were insufficient funds to pay all
the gifts, and thus if Reid’s gift was truly to take effect only after
the charities were paid, she would not receive the apartment. 303
Reid petitioned for reformation, arguing that Sonder did not
intend this result, notwithstanding the trust’s explicit terms. 304
296. 325 P.3d 987 (Alaska 2014).
297. See id. at 991 (claiming misrepresentations in regard to the “nature
and purpose of the documents [that] she signed”).
298. Id. at 992.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. 63 So. 3d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
302. See id. at 9 (setting out the provisions of the trust).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 9–10.
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The trial court denied the reformation, and the appellate court
affirmed. 305 It stated that “it is not our function to conduct a de
novo review of the evidence, but simply to determine whether
there exists in the record competent substantial evidence to
support the judgment by the trial court.” 306 This standard held
even though the standard of proof on the reformation issue was
“clear and convincing evidence.” 307 The court described the
interaction of the two standards as follows:
In denying the petition for reformation, the probate court
necessarily determined Reid did not meet her burden of
proving the allegations of the petition by clear and convincing
evidence. In civil cases prosecuted under this standard, “an
appellate court may not overturn a trial court’s finding
regarding the sufficiency of the evidence unless the finding is
unsupported by record evidence, or as a matter of law, no one
could reasonably find such evidence to be clear and
convincing.” 308

One judge vigorously dissented on the reformation issue,
adducing seven pages’ worth of evidence that Sonder absolutely
wanted Reid to take the apartment regardless of what the
charities took. 309 In the dissenting judge’s view, the evidence was
indeed clear and convincing that Sonder would have wanted his
trust reformed. 310 Had the probate court taken this view, the
appellate court would have been obliged to affirm.
As in Purcella, the lower court in Sonder was cautious about
reforming unambiguous terms where there was conflicting
evidence about the settlor’s intent. 311 Under these circumstances,
305. Id. at 11.
306. Id. at 10 (citations omitted).
307. Id.
308. Id. (quoting McKesson Drug Co. v. Williams, 706 So. 2d 352, 353 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998)) (emphasis added).
309. See id. at 11–18 (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that the majority’s “conclusion not only renders superfluous section
736.0415 but ignores the record as well”).
310. See id. at 18 (“[B]ecause it was proved by clear and convincing evidence
that both the accomplishment of the settlor’s intent and the terms of the trust
were affected by a drafting mistake . . . the reformation sought should have been
granted.”).
311. See id. at 10 (majority opinion) (concluding that the record was not so
clear as to allow for judicial reformation of the will).
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deferential standards of appellate review will not disrupt the
operation of the reform, under which the status quo is
maintained unless there is a high degree of certainty that a
mistake has been made. But where the evidence is mixed,
reasonable trial courts can reasonably reach divergent
conclusions about the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
the evidence. Thus it is not impossible for a trial court to
determine, on mixed evidence, that the evidence supporting a
proposed reformation is clear and convincing. If the appellate
courts stick by their statements about deferring to the trial court
determinations of fact, it is unclear how seriously they will
scrutinize these lower court decisions. This is hardly the rigorous
policing of the clear and convincing evidence standard that the
drafters of the reform prescribed.
While some scholars have suggested, consistent with the
reformers, that the clear and convincing evidence standard
should lead to a more searching level of appellate scrutiny, 312 it is
hardly surprising that a wills law reform provision has not
generally altered longstanding rules regarding appellate review.
These rules allocate decision-making authority based on the
relative institutional competence of trial and appellate courts and
on considerations of efficiency. 313 Presumably these factors are as
pertinent to litigation over wills as to any other area of litigation.
Thus, it is not realistic to expect that appellate scrutiny will push
lower courts to be more careful about their fact finding.
However, as is true with respect to the lower courts’
somewhat casual application of the clear and convincing evidence
standard, the cases on appeal do not as a general matter feel
particularly controversial, but they do not feel typical either.
Neither Purcella nor Reid involved the dropped paragraph or
misdescribed donee paradigmatic under the mistake correction
reform. The settlor in Purcella appears simply to have changed

312. See generally, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule 50(a): Rationing and
Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 645,
655 (1988); Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 KAN.
L. REV. 1, 39–40 (1991).
313. See Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the
Civil-Criminal Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 437, 444–47 (2004) (outlining and
critiquing traditional rationales for appellate court deference).
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her mind about the terms of the trust she created. 314 The
comments to Restatement section 12.1 specifically address this
situation, stating that reformation is not available “to modify a
document in order to give effect to the donor’s post-execution
change of mind . . . or to compensate for other changes in
circumstances.” 315 The facts—and the mistake—in Reid are more
complicated, involving a technical drafting problem whose
significance did not become clear until the lower court interpreted
the language of the trust. 316 This was not the classic scrivener’s
error that misrendered the testator’s wishes, but rather a case
where the settlor never formed a wish pertaining to the choice
that ultimately had to be made among gifts. 317 Because the facts
of the cases depart from the reform statute’s model, the lower
courts in these cases, unlike the courts in Kuralt and Ehrlich,
declined to intervene. Under these circumstances, the deferential
standard of review seems beside the point. It is where the lower
courts stretch to remedy mistakes outside the paradigm of the
reforms that the deferential standard of review might make the
most difference. In these cases, the extent of appellate court
deference will determine in part whether testators who do not fit
the reforms’ model—because they never reached a final decision,
or because they changed their mind—will be protected.

314. See Purcella v. Purcella Tr., 325 P.3d 987, 991–95 (Alaska 2014)
(reciting the facts of the case).
315. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 12.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2015). On post-creation changes in circumstances,
see Morey v. Everbank, 93 So. 3d 482, 491 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(“[D]eterioration in the decedent’s financial circumstances between the time he
executed estate planning documents and the date of death . . . did not constitute
a ‘mistake’ requiring reformation of trust documents.”).
316. As the court below construed the trust, by including the $25,000 cash
gift in the same paragraph as the gift of the apartment, the attorney made the
entire gift to Reid subject to abatement. Reid v. Sonder, 63 So. 3d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2011).
317. While there was little dispute that the settlor wished that Reid receive
his apartment, it was not clear that the settlor even considered the possibility
that the trust would lack sufficient cash to cover all the designated gifts. Id. at
10–11.
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IV. Implications
When we see a will that is properly executed, we tend to
assume that it was truly intended by the testator. But we could
be wrong. The testator might have lacked mental capacity, 318 or
the apparent will might have been written as a joke or
stratagem. 319 Conversely, when we see a will that is not properly
executed, we think we know that the decedent did not intend the
document to serve as his will. But here again we could be wrong.
The decedent might not have understood that, for example, his
signature needed to be observed by two witnesses or that the two
witnesses needed to see each other sign. Or the decedent’s lawyer
may have failed to competently supervise the will’s execution.
How confident must we be about the mistake before we
correct the error? In the case of the apparently-improper will, the
answer built into the will execution and mistake correction
reforms is “very confident.” Proof of the testator’s intent in these
cases can only be based on evidence extrinsic to the will, evidence
that the decedent cannot rebut or correct. This evidence is
thought in most instances to be inherently unreliable and
dangerous. Thus, before steps are taken to correct apparent
errors, the evidence of the testator’s intent must be “clear and
convincing.” But if the objective of the clear and convincing
evidence standard is to provide reliability, the case law to date is
a bit discouraging. Courts do not consistently demand all that
much in the way of proof.
In this Part of the Article, I consider the reforms in light of
the conventionally-accepted objective of wills law, which is to
carry out individuals’ wishes with respect to the disposition of
their property at death. I first evaluate the reforms’ effect on the
safe harbor function of wills, assessing why incentives that are
used in other areas of law to produce clarity ex ante might not
318. On the requirement of mental capacity, see generally DUKEMINIER &
SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 266–74; 1–12 SCHOENBLUM, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS
§ 12.17 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2015).
319. See Fleming v. Morrison, 72 N.E. 499, 499 (Mass. 1904) (presenting a
situation in which a will was executed allegedly for the purpose of inducing the
beneficiary to sleep with the testator); Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of
Wills, supra note 38, at 542 n.75 (describing “wills” executed as part of Masonic
order initiation ceremonies).
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work for wills. I then question whether the safe harbor accurately
describes all testators’ will-making processes. As it turns out,
wills law acknowledges two rather different testamentary selves,
one who is capable of unambiguous, once and for all decision
making, and another who is distinctively less self-reliant in
making his wishes clear. These two selves implicate somewhat
divergent views of testamentary freedom. The clear and
convincing evidence standard is meant to mediate between these
selves and these views. Not surprisingly, it has not been
altogether effective in doing so.
A. Safe Harbors
Let us return to the reforms’ premise: it is only human to err.
Testators, as well as their attorneys, sometimes will hash up a
will’s execution, include a mistaken term, or omit an intended
provision. These mistakes are often of trivial import and obvious.
Rather than pretending that an error was not made, the law can
forgive it. 320 But to ensure that the law does not entirely give up
on the functionalism of form, it will attend only to errors of a
certain kind: “innocuous,” “innocent,” “harmless” errors. And
these errors must be proved by evidence that is “clear and
convincing.” 321 The will-execution and mistake-correction reforms
function as limited exceptions to otherwise-adequate general
principles. They are not meant to change the requirements for a
valid will, but simply provide a mechanism to prevent
meaningless blunders from defeating a testator’s convincingly
evidenced intent.
This formulation fits into established tropes with which we
think about other legal fields. The requirements for due execution
of wills and the doctrines precluding extrinsic evidence of intent
are rules. Either a will is signed or it is not; either it is witnessed
by the specified number of witnesses or it is not; either its words
accurately reflect the testator’s wishes or they do not. 322 These
320. See supra Part II.A (discussing the logical underpinning of the
harmless error doctrine).
321. See supra Part II.B (discussing the reasoning behind the harmless error
doctrine and the standards courts use in applying it).
322. On rules and standards, see generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and
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rules make best sense ex ante, when the objective is to encourage
the testator to provide the clearest, most reliable possible
evidence of his desires. 323 But rules will be rules, always overly
broad or narrow, and they operate indiscriminately, invalidating
intended alongside unintended wills. 324 Post hoc, fact and
circumstance based adjustments are needed. These are provided
by the reforms, which operate as standards; 325 they do not
prescribe the facts that will establish that the testator intended
the document to serve as a will or that the terms of the will are
mistaken. 326 Standards allow us to look at a wider universe of
facts and to achieve results more equitable than the rules
permit. 327
Ordinarily the ex ante/ex post framework addresses
incentives. 328 Rules operating ex ante, like the Wills Act
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Carol M.
Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577 (1988); Kathleen
Sullivan, Foreword, The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22
(1992).
323. See generally Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex
Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125 (2013) [hereinafter
Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom] (enumerating ex ante considerations
relevant to the exercise of testamentary freedom); see also Cass R. Sunstein,
Problems With Rules, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 953, 961 (1995) (“The key characteristic
of rules is that they attempt to specify outcomes before particular cases arise.
Rules are largely defined by the ex ante character of law.”).
324. See Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93
YALE L.J. 65, 70 (1983) (describing the over- and under-inclusiveness of rules);
Kennedy, supra note 322, at 1689 (same); see also Sunstein, supra note 323, at
1022 (“Because of their ex ante character, rules will usually be overinclusive and
underinclusive with reference to the arguments that justify them.”).
325. See Sullivan, supra note 322, at 66 (stating that standards “spare
individuals from being sacrificed on the altar of rules”).
326. See Sunstein, supra note 323, at 965 (“With a standard, it is not
possible to know what we have in advance.”).
327. While the reforms do not specify which facts must be proven to show a
document was intended to be a will or a term is mistaken, they also do not seem
to envision an all-things-considered type of analysis. As noted earlier, Uniform
Probate Code section 2-503 requires a showing that the decedent intended “the
document or writing” to constitute his will, and Uniform Probate Code section
2-805 requires evidence of “what the transferor’s intention was and that the
terms of the governing instrument were affected by a mistake.” UNIF. PROBATE
CODE § 2-503 (amended 2010) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2013). The analysis is not
meant to be holistic.
328. See Rose, supra note 322, at 591 (describing how the ex ante
perspective encourages consideration of matters “from the perspective of persons
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execution rules, are incentives for clear thinking, clear exposition,
and clear authentication. If it is determined that an issue is best
addressed ex ante, then rule violations are generally not excused,
lest we weaken the incentives that led to the adoption of the ex
ante rule in the first place. 329 On this reasoning, the automaticinvalidity rule for noncompliant wills seems appropriate. 330
If we take this view, the kind of free-ranging,
all-things-considered analysis of a case such as Ehrlich is
troubling because it threatens the safe harbor function of wills. 331
The forces that conspire against will making are strong;
similar to the parties at the outset of their relationship, and then figure out how
we want them to think and act before all contingencies become realities”).
329. See id. at 592
To put it baldly, the ex ante perspective generally means sticking it to
those who fail to protect themselves in advance against contingencies
that, as it happens, work out badly for them. No muddiness here. All
parties are presumed to be clear-sighted overseers of their own best
interests; it is up to them to tie up all the loose ends that they can,
and the courts should let the advantages and disadvantages fall
where they may. Why? Because this will encourage people to plan
and to act carefully, knowing that no judicial cavalry will ride to their
rescue later.
330. Glover, Decoupling, supra note 24, at 625 (“[T]he rule of strict
compliance encourages those who desire to distribute their property through
wills to comply with the prescribed will-execution formalities.”); see also STERK,
supra note 210, at 228 (“[T]he mysteries created by the formalities channel
testators to lawyers, who are trained in . . . preparing wills.”).
331. See Pamela R. Champine, My Will Be Done: Accommodating the Erring
and Atypical Testator, 80 NEB. L. REV. 387, 438 (2001) (“[P]reservation of a safe
harbor is essential to a will reformation doctrine.”); Glover, Decoupling, supra
note 24, at 620 (“[W]ill formalities form a safe harbor for the exercise of
testamentary freedom. When testators communicate testamentary intent
through a written, signed, and attested document, they have assurance that the
court will recognize her expression of testamentary intent as legally valid.”);
Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1031 (“[I]f we gave up a will requirement
or . . . requirement of testamentary intent, we would create an administrative
nightmare—any evidence would be relevant to show how a decedent would want
her property distributed. We would remove the finality or safe harbor of a will
and discourage efficient estate planning.”).
The “safe harbor” of wills law differs significantly from safe harbors in other
areas of law, where “a safe harbor describes behavior that will not be penalized,
and leaves other facts that fall outside the safe harbor to be judged
case-by-case.” Susan C. Morse, Safe Harbors, Sure Shipwrecks, 49 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2613543. For a
discussion of safe harbors in tax law, see generally Emily Cauble, Safe Harbors
in Tax Law, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1385 (2015).
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confronting death, property and family in one simultaneous act is
not easy. The testator who nonetheless manages in light of these
forces to formulate and state his wishes may well want them
protected
against
subsequent
assaults—not
only
by
self-interested potential beneficiaries, but from his own post-will
changes of mind. 332 The idea here is that once the testator tells
his story, he can be confident it will not be altered and that he
can, as it were, cross off his to-do list the emotionally difficult
task of providing for post-mortem distribution of probate
assets. 333 The safe harbor protects him from having to state his
reasons for doing as he did, and from attempts to disrupt his
well-considered plan. 334 Once he has stated his intent, no more
needs to be—or should be—done.
If this is an accurate description of wills, then the old
automatic-invalidity and no-extrinsic-evidence rules have clear
advantages. While in some cases they will indeed defeat intent,
they nonetheless prevent litigation that many testators might
find quite troubling in their open exploration of the testators’
private lives, sexual affairs, or preferences among friends and
relatives. If the point of making a will is to prevent
under-informed guessing about what the testator might have or
probably wanted, then there is wit to a hard-edged rule that puts
such questions out of bounds. 335
332. See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in
Search of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1047 (2004) [hereinafter
Hirsch, Default Rules] (describing testators’ peace of mind in knowing that their
assets will be distributed as they have directed); Orth, supra note 8, at 81
(“Some objective criteria by which persons may signal their final desires with
respect to succession to their property are desirable, thus allowing subsequent
fact-finders to proceed quickly and inexpensively to process their estates.”).
333. See Champine, supra note 331, at 435 (“[T]he testator understands that
he executes the document for the purpose of expressing his wishes. There is no
reason he would expect an inquiry to occur after death that could change the
dispositive scheme he adopted.”).
334. See Lindgren, supra note 5, at 1031 (“[T]he problem with probate is
that the person whose wishes we want to implement is dead. She can no longer
speak. In a system without the safe harbor of a will, a testator might have to go
to extraordinary lengths to ensure that her wishes were followed after her
death.”).
335. For further commentary on whether a relaxation of Wills Act
formalities, specifically the adoption of the harmless error rule, actually results
in a reduction in the number of “valid” wills being denied probate due to
noncompliance with required formalities, see generally Orth, supra note 8, at
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In wills cases, however, the line of reasoning that focuses on
incentives seems to fit imperfectly. 336 The contracting party who
fails to put his agreement in writing where the Statute of Frauds
so requires will learn from the invalidity of his contract to get it
in writing next time. However, testators do not get a second
chance; they learn nothing from the invalidation of their wills. 337
Perhaps other potential will-makers will hear what happened to
their unfortunate acquaintance, and the Wills Act incentives will
operate for them—or send them scurrying to a (competent)
lawyer. But this may not be very likely. 338 Or perhaps the
incentive is addressed to the lawyer. Yet this, too, is questionable
because apart from the prospect of malpractice liability or
reputational loss, she is not punished if a will fails due to
improper execution. It is not her dispositive wishes that will be
defeated. Adding to the complexity is the potential unjust
enrichment to unintended beneficiaries if “harmless” mistakes
are not corrected. 339
The reforms appear to seek a legal middle ground. They
allow consideration of only a narrow range of mistakes—those
involving efforts to enter the safe harbor—and only where failure
is proven to a high degree of certainty via the clear and
convincing evidence standard. They assume that testators have
formed a fixed intent, and address only the problem of
inadvertent errors in setting out those wishes in the will or
properly executing the completed document. Read literally, the
80–81.
336. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557, 618 (1992) (suggesting that facilitative rules such as those
governing will execution do not fit easily into the ex ante/ex post framework).
337. Adam J. Hirsch, Text and Time: A Theory of Testamentary
Obsolescence, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 609, 634 (2009) [hereinafter Hirsch, Text and
Time] (“[E]state planning is a one-time (or at best infrequent) activity.”); Hirsch,
Default Rules, supra note 332, at 1041 (describing how testators are “mortals
who, as such, can only die once” and thus may not incur the information costs
necessary to learn inheritance rules).
338. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 332, at 1055 (asserting that the
rules of intestacy are “relatively obscure” and expressing doubt that people
outside the decedent’s family would know whether a transfer occurred via
intestacy as opposed to an estate plan).
339. On the importance of preventing unjust enrichment, see generally
Langbein & Waggoner, Reformation of Wills, supra note 38, at 524–25, 572–77,
590.
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reforms preclude, as did prior law, inquiry into broad questions of
dispositive intent. 340
As we have seen, sometimes courts have found it difficult to
stay within the limits written into the reforms, and the clear and
convincing evidence standard has not prevented them from
crossing the lines. But that may be less about the courts than
about testators themselves, many of whose will making does not
seem to conform to the safe harbor paradigm. 341 Testators often
stray from the safe harbors they created in earlier wills,
scribbling changes on the document itself, preparing new
documents whose connection with their wills is unclear, or
otherwise indicating changed views.
Much of the scholarship assessing the possible effects of the
harmless error and mistake correction reforms assumes that
these non-conforming testators will be people with relatively low
levels of either sophistication or resources, or both. Well-to-do
testators, presumably better informed than those with fewer
resources, will consult attorneys, 342 who, in turn, will only
endeavor harder to avoid litigation. 343 It is less affluent testators,
who cannot afford good (or any) estate planning who will cobble
up their wills at home or scribble their intentions in holographic
documents that may or may not be meant to have legal effect. 344
340. Langbein specifically considered the safe harbor function of wills and
clearly did not mean to undermine it. Langbein, Excusing Harmless Errors,
supra note 10, at 4, 70.
341. See Hirsch, Default Rules, supra note 332, at 1047–50 (describing
resistance to estate planning).
342. See Glover, The Therapeutic Function, supra note 77, at 173 (expressing
concern that “a rule of relaxed formalism could encourage testators to execute
wills informally and without the assistance of a lawyer”); Guzman, supra note
153, at 353 (arguing that “nebulous” standards for determining testamentary
intent “more likely [affect] the holographic will and, thus, testators who are less
educated, with . . . less wealth or ability to visit lawyers”); Hirsch, Default Rules,
supra note 332, at 1051 (“[A]ssorted studies have all found a pronounced
correlation between wealth and testation—the more prosperous one’s
circumstances, the likelier one is to execute a will.”).
343. See supra notes 56–57 (describing how draftsmen will strive to avoid
litigation).
344. See Hirsch, Incomplete Wills, supra note 114, at 1426
(“[I]ncompleteness [in wills] typically stems from planning errors, often
encountered in wills produced by lay drafters[, who tend to be] testators of
lesser means.”); see also Glover, A Taxonomy, supra note 153, at 17–18 (“When
an estate-planning lawyer prepares a will, donative testamentary intent is
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The case law challenges these assumptions. In Kuralt, Hall,
and Herceg, the testators all had access to—and at some point in
the testation process actually used—attorneys. 345 Nor did these
testators, especially Kuralt, lack means. The problem seems to be
broader than lack of resources, experience, or good advice.
B. Testamentary Freedom and the Selves of Wills Law
Underneath the old, unforgiving rules of wills law and the
reforms lie two somewhat discordant visions of testamentary
freedom and of the self who makes a will. Courts and
commentators alike agree that, with but a few exceptions related
to family protection, the goal of wills law is to carry out the
wishes of the testator. 346 In this view, will making is an exercise
of freedom of choice; the testator decides what is to be done with
his property. The testator envisioned here, the one making
choices, is rational in something like the manner presumed by
traditional law and economics literature. He is autonomous,
capable of making for himself the testamentary decisions that
advance his self-determined aims, whatever those aims might be
(and they are not for others to judge). 347 A testator capable of
rarely an issue[, but holographs,] typically drafted by lawmen without the aid of
an attorney . . . lack cogent drafting that clearly evinces the testator’s intent to
make gifts that become effective at death.”).
345. Indeed, one of the saddest aspects of teaching strict-compliance and
no-reformation rule cases is that so many of them involve instruments prepared
by lawyers. See generally, e.g., In re Groffman, [1969] 1 WLR 733 (PD), 1969 WL
26902 (attorney failed to supervise execution ceremony); In re Will of Ranney,
589 A.2d 1339 (N.J. 1991) (attorneys erroneously believed that a signature on
the self-proving affidavit obviated the need for the testator to sign the will
itself); Conn. Junior Republic v. Sharon Hosp., 448 A.2d 190 (Conn. 1982)
(attorney inserted incorrect charitable beneficiaries, using an outdated will).
346. See Gulliver & Tilson, supra note 13, at 2 (“[O]ne fundamental
proposition is that, under a legal system recognizing the individualistic
institution of private property and granting to the owner the power to determine
his successors in ownership, the general philosophy of the courts should favor
giving effect to an intentional exercise of that power.”); see also Adam J. Hirsch
& William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 5–
18 (1992) (surveying the reasons conventionally thought to justify testamentary
freedom); Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom, supra note 323, at 1133–38
(same).
347. For arguments that we do, however, judge, especially in the context of
mental capacity, see generally Jane B. Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity and
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making these choices is also capable of learning and following the
rules of will execution—or of consulting an attorney who can
properly guide him. Similarly, he is capable of saying what he
means in his will, and meaning what he says. He will make no
errors in signing his will because he is anxious to put his intent
beyond question. For the same reason, he will clearly and
unambiguously state his wishes; that is the very point of the
will-making enterprise. This testator is deciding once and for all;
he seeks the safe harbor. Once he enters it, he needs no further
help from the law because he has been self-reliant and has
protected himself. For this person, the automatic invalidity rule
and the no extrinsic evidence rule are appropriate. More
accurately, because this testator’s will is properly executed and
unambiguously written, the invalidity and evidentiary rules are
irrelevant.
But wills law recognizes another self and another view of
testamentary freedom. Consider just a few common situations
that can disrupt the most rational, well-considered estate plans:
a beneficiary named in a will dies before the testator, the testator
divorces the spouse named as a beneficiary in his will, or a child
is born after the will is executed. 348 The self-determining,
self-reliant testator would revise his estate plan in response to
these events by writing a new will or preparing a codicil, and we
could have rules that would in effect require such vigilance by
letting the estate plan misfire if the testator failed to make a
revision. 349 But we do not. Every state has a statutory scheme
that names a substitute taker for the deceased devisee, 350 revokes
testamentary gifts to divorced spouses, 351 and provides a share
Testamentary Capacity, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1043 (1987); Leslie, supra note 5.
348. All of these have in common that they involve events arising after the
will has been executed and reveal the effect on wills of the passage of time. See
generally Hirsch, Text and Time, supra note 337.
349. See id. at 625 n.81 (noting that diligent testators will revise estate
plans); id. at 630 (“[W]hether lawmakers should update an estate
plan . . . where the testator has not lifted a finger to amend the will is ultimately
the most interesting . . . question we have before us.”).
350. These rules are “anti-lapse” rules. For an example, see DEL. CODE ANN.
TIT. 12, § 2313 (West 2015).
351. For a typical revocation on divorce statute, see FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 732.507(1) (West 2007) (“Any provision of a will executed by a married person
that affects the spouse of that person shall become void upon the divorce of that
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for a “pretermitted” child. 352 These rules contemplate a different
self. The testator here, the one who takes no steps to protect his
own estate plan, is rational in the more complicated manner
described by recent behavioral law and economics literature. This
testator, however self-determining and self-reliant he might have
been at the pre-will stage, is, post-will, fallible and vulnerable.
Perhaps due to the changes in circumstances he is emotional;
perhaps he is just inattentive. Wills law could require him to be
more deliberate and self-determining in exercising his
testamentary freedom, as it could require him to protect himself,
but it does not. Rather, it tolerates his errors and shields his
estate from the consequences of his failures.
This tolerance extends beyond failures to keep wills updated.
The principle falsa demonstratio non nocet (mere erroneous
description does not vitiate) allows courts simply to disregard
certain mistaken terms, such as incorrect house numbers, that
are inessential to the devise at hand. 353 The doctrine of dependent
relative revocation protects a testator who revokes his earlier will
based on a mistaken belief that he has executed a new, valid will
by permitting probate of the earlier, apparently-revoked will in
lieu of intent-defeating intestacy. 354 In the case of “secret trusts,”
courts permit admission of extrinsic evidence to prove that a
seemingly-absolute devise was made based on the devisee’s
promise to hold the property in trust. 355 These are all preventable
person or upon the dissolution or annulment of the marriage.”).
352. For a typical pretermitted child statute, see NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 30-2321 (West 2014).
353. See, e.g., Arnheiter v. Arnheiter, 125 A.2d 914, 915 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1956) (describing how a testator devised her interest in “No. 304 Harrison
Avenue, Harrison, New Jersey,” but owned No. 317 on that same street and
allowing a devise of testator’s interest in “premises known as Harrison Avenue,
Harrison, New Jersey”).
354. See generally DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 229–34; 2-21
SCHOENBLUM, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 21.57 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender
2015). Sometimes intestacy may come closer than the earlier will to
approximating the testator’s intent. For discussion of this problem, see generally
George E. Palmer, Dependent Relative Revocation and its Relation to Relief for
Mistake, 69 MICH. L. REV. 989, 998–99 (1971); Richard F. Storrow, Dependent
Relative Revocation: Presumption or Probability?, 48 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
L.J. 497, 508–09 (2014).
355. Some courts allow extrinsic evidence also in the case of the “semi-secret
trust,” where the will indicates that the devisee is to hold the property as
trustee, but does not describe the trust beneficiary. On secret and semi-secret
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mistakes, and we could say that those who make them deserve to
have their wishes defeated because they have not taken sufficient
care in preparing their wills. But again we do not. Preventing
unjust enrichment is one part of the story, but another part has
to do with acceptance of the propensity to err.
Some of the bungled execution and interpretation cases seem
to involve this erring testator. In variations of Kuralt’s situation,
they write letters or other documents that gesture toward the
wills they are going to make—but they do not quite make them.
Or they execute wills with ambiguous terms; they don’t say what
they mean or mean what they say. They seem tentative or
ambivalent. They cannot quite bring themselves to the
once-and-for-all decisional closure that would allow them to enter
the safe harbor. Or, in other cases, involving what might be—but
aren’t clearly—alterations to a valid will, they do not stick to
their previously made decisions. For these testators, the
automatic invalidity and no-extrinsic-evidence rules are perilous.
I do not wish to overdraw the comparison between the two
testamentary selves. It is surely not the case that some people are
entirely rational in the traditional, choosing sense, while others
experience only the bounded rationality of the erring testator.
Nor is it true that careful, self-reliant testators will never make
mistakes, while less careful testators will always make them.
Still, the typology can be helpful in understanding the larger
objectives of the reforms—and particularly the use of the clear
and convincing evidence standard.
Clarity, efficiency, and intent-effectuation would all be
easiest to attain were all testamentary selves conventionally
rational and self-reliant. The will would literally speak for itself.
One way of understanding the automatic-invalidity and
no-extrinsic-evidence rules is as efforts to turn potentially-erring
selves into self-reliant ones. But for reasons we have seen—the
dead do not learn, nor do others learn from their experience—the
strategy has been ineffectual. 356
trusts, see generally DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 9, at 433; 5-40
SCHOENBLUM, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 40.13 (LexisNexis Matthew Bender
2015).
356. See Kennedy, supra note 322, at 1699 (“If the argument for rules is to
work, we must anticipate that private parties will in fact respond to the threat
of the sanction of nullity by learning to operate the system. But real as opposed
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How might the law extend a bit of mercy to the errant
testator, without giving up on encouraging at least some
self-reliance and protecting safe harbors? The reforms draw the
line at a limited category of “harmless” errors, errors of very
specific kinds—the errors of testators who have come close to the
first testamentary model, who have made once-and-for-all
decisions. 357 They then employ the clear and convincing evidence
standard to ensure that the errors excused are only errors of the
specified kinds. But it appears that it is difficult to cabin judicial
sympathy for the erring self to the precisely specified categories.
And this is why it is not surprising to see the cases slip from the
narrow range of errors specified in the statute to the broader
range of issues raised by cases like Kuralt and Ehrlich. 358
*

*

*

*

Years of applying the automatic invalidity and no-extrinsic
evidence rules have been ineffectual at changing erring selves
into self-reliant selves. While the rhetoric and some of the reality
of wills law has always emphasized the rational, choosing self for
whom wills rules are a means for furthering self-determined
ends, other parts of wills law protect the emotional, ambivalent
self, who for whom wills rules are not a path for self-actualization
and, in some cases, may only impede it. Both selves are a part of
wills law. 359 If wills law were concerned only with the line
between determinate rules and fact-sensitive adjudication, the
clear and convincing evidence standard might serviceably address
the problem. 360 But the divergence between the self-reliant
choosing self and the erring irresolute self—the self that cannot
to hypothetical legal actors may be unwilling or unable to do this.”).
357. The commentary makes clear that not all errors will or should be
corrected. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE
TRANSFERS § 12.1 cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (explaining that reformation is
not available “to modify a document in order to give effect to the donor’s
post-execution change of mind” or “to compensate for other changes in
circumstances” such as an asset’s loss of value after the will’s execution).
358. See supra Part III.B (discussing the Kuralt and Ehrlich cases).
359. Cf. Rose, supra note 322, at 593 (suggesting that the law oscillates
between crystals and mud rather than choosing between them).
360. But see Sherwin, supra note 8, at 476 (arguing that the clear and
convincing evidence standard is not a compromise but “simply a choice to
promote accuracy at some expense to the various benefits of formality rules”).
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bring itself to choose—is not a divergence that is evidentiary in
nature. Because wills law embraces not only the choosing self but
also the erring self, the clear and convincing evidence standard
has not, and will not, function as a serious limit on mistake
correction.
V. Conclusion
The reforms to wills law’s musty will-execution and
no-reformation rules were meant as technical fixes to
long-recognized technical problems. Lest anyone worry that
large-scale change was intended, the reforms permit correction
only of a narrow universe of technical defects and require that
those defects be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Examination of the case law applying the clear and
convincing evidence standard shows that it has been difficult to
cabin the reforms to the specific technical errors that the
reformers had in mind. This slippage demonstrates the limitation
of thinking about wills entirely in technical terms. For at least
some testators some of the time, will making is not the process
postulated by the traditional rhetoric of free testation, a process
of once-and-for-all self-determining choice. Rather, it is a more
tentative, ambivalent, on-going process in which closure is hard
to attain. Wills law is pulled in opposing directions,
encouraging—but not always demanding—clarity and care.
The courts’ problems applying the clear and convincing
evidence standard derive in great measure from the difficult facts
with which the courts must deal. The very different testamentary
selves that the law currently recognizes make and change their
wills in very different ways. A true reform of wills law requires
open acknowledgement and embrace of these differences.

